Borgers tilman (25 resultados)
Idioma: Inglés
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Librería: Star Canyon Books, Woodland, CA, Estados Unidos de AmericaStar Canyon Books
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EUR 32,46
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Soft cover. Condición: Very Good. Science Direct/Elsevier. Expanded mid-size. Book is clean, with a strong spine, strong binding, no tears, and no writing, with only a small amount of handling wear. Book has approximately 500 pages, containing 16 exceptionally detailed and comprehensive abstracts from distinguished academicians…and scholars. Profusely illustrated with mathematical delineations. The average length of each monograph is approximately 30 pages. Three of the titles are as follows: 'Social Norms in Networks,' 'Stability for Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics,' 'Evolution of Preferences in Structured Populations: Genes, Guns, and Culture.' Includes references after each abstract. Securely packed in a lidded box.
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- Primera edición
Librería: Textbooks_Source, Columbia, MO, Estados Unidos de AmericaTextbooks_Source
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EUR 76,55
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hardcover. Condición: Good. 1st Edition. Ships in a BOX from Central Missouri! May not include working access code. Will not include dust jacket. Has used sticker(s) and some writing or highlighting. UPS shipping for most packages, (Priority Mail for AK/HI/APO/PO Boxes).
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Librería: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, Estados Unidos de AmericaBooks From California
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EUR 86,33
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hardcover. Condición: Very Good.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices
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EUR 109,48
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Condición: New.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices
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EUR 128,72
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Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Idioma: Inglés
Editorial: Cambridge University Press CUP, 2000
Serie: Churchill Lectures in Economics, Libro 2 de 3. Libro 2 de 3 - Churchill Lectures in Economics
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Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de AmericaBooks Puddle
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EUR 131,40
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Condición: New. pp. 140.
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Librería: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaRarewaves USA
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EUR 137,96
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Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of… the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino UnidoGreatBookPricesUK
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EUR 129,41
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Condición: New.
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Librería: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Reino UnidoTHE SAINT BOOKSTORE
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EUR 129,42
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Hardback. Condición: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino UnidoGreatBookPricesUK
Contactar con el vendedorVendedor de 5 estrellasCondición: Usado - Como Nuevo
EUR 135,26
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Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
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Librería: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Reino UnidoRarewaves.com USA
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EUR 170,19
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Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of… the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books
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EUR 163,49
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Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
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Librería: Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaRarewaves USA United
Contactar con el vendedorVendedor de 5 estrellasCondición: Nuevo
EUR 140,07
Envío por EUR 43,77Se envía dentro de Estados Unidos de AmericaCantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of… the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Idioma: Inglés
Editorial: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Serie: Churchill Lectures in Economics, Libro 2 de 3. Libro 2 de 3 - Churchill Lectures in Economics
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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
Contactar con el vendedorVendedor de 5 estrellasCondición: Nuevo
EUR 125,92
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Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Arie…l Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.
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Librería: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Reino UnidoRarewaves.com UK
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EUR 159,89
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Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of… the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
Contactar con el vendedorVendedor de 5 estrellasCondición: Nuevo
EUR 170,02
Envío por EUR 62,75Se envía de Alemania a Estados Unidos de AmericaCantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - What is the best way of auctioning an asset How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods How should exchanges be organized In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration… of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino UnidoMajestic Books
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EUR 96,15
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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 272.
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Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de AmericaBooks Puddle
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EUR 101,17
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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 272.
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Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books
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EUR 95,02
Envío por EUR 14,60Se envía de Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de AmericaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.
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Librería: Biblios, frankfurt am main, HESSE, AlemaniaBiblios
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EUR 96,21
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Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 272.
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Librería: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaGrand Eagle Retail
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EUR 133,43
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an expl…oration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Idioma: Inglés
Editorial: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Serie: Churchill Lectures in Economics, Libro 2 de 3. Libro 2 de 3 - Churchill Lectures in Economics
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Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino UnidoMajestic Books
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EUR 136,96
Envío por EUR 7,59Se envía de Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de AmericaCantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 140 44:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.
Idioma: Inglés
Editorial: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Serie: Churchill Lectures in Economics, Libro 2 de 3. Libro 2 de 3 - Churchill Lectures in Economics
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Librería: Biblios, frankfurt am main, HESSE, AlemaniaBiblios
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EUR 136,53
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Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 140.
Idioma: Inglés
Editorial: Cambridge University Press, 2004
Serie: Churchill Lectures in Economics, Libro 2 de 3. Libro 2 de 3 - Churchill Lectures in Economics
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Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemaniamoluna
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EUR 97,69
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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Written by one of the world s leading thinkers on game theory, this short book offers a challenging and accessible analysis of the relationship between economics and language. Essential reading for all social scientis…ts.Über den Autor.
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Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino UnidoCitiRetail
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EUR 145,52
Envío por EUR 43,21Se envía de Reino Unido a Estados Unidos de AmericaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an expl…oration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
