Krahmer daniel (17 resultados)

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  • Libros (17)

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  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: OUP USA, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    • Primera edición

    Librería: Optimon Books, Gravesend, KENT, Reino UnidoOptimon Books

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    Condición: Usado - Aceptable

    EUR 72,09

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles

    Hardcover. Condición: Good. 1st Edition. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In this book, Tilman Brgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument.An 8vo hardback in glossy black boards with gilt lettering to spine. The light green dust jacket has subtle finger prints and three short strokes from black ball-pens on surface. Tiny marks of light blue ink (probably from printing) to fore-edge, otherwise very good. Copyright 漏 OUP.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: OUP USA, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    • Primera edición

    Librería: Optimon Books, Gravesend, KENT, Reino UnidoOptimon Books

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    Condición: Usado - Aceptable

    EUR 72,09

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles

    Hardcover. Condición: Good. 1st Edition. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In this book, Tilman Brgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An 8vo hardback in glossy black boards with gilt lettering to spine. The greenish dust jacket is sealed in a transparent wrapper with three short strokes of black ink to surface and a few blue stain to its verso. Small corner of the plastic wrapper inside the top rear fold is crease and semi-detached. Also, tiny marks of blue ink (probably from printing) to fore-edge. Otherwise in very good condition. Copyright 漏 OUP.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 108,17

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    Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles

    Condición: New.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices

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    Condición: Usado - Como Nuevo

    EUR 127,07

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    Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles

    Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Inc, US, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: Rarewaves USA, HEBRON, KY, Estados Unidos de AmericaRarewaves USA

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 135,93

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    Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles

    Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino UnidoGreatBookPricesUK

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 129,29

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    Condición: New.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino UnidoGreatBookPricesUK

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    Condición: Usado - Como Nuevo

    EUR 133,43

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    Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles

    Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Inc, US, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Reino UnidoRarewaves.com USA

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 164,54

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    Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford Univ Pr, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

    • Tapa dura

    Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 161,49

    Envío por EUR 14,58 
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    Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles

    Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Inc, US, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

    • Tapa dura

    Librería: Rarewaves USA United, HEBRON, KY, Estados Unidos de AmericaRarewaves USA United

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 138,47

    Envío por EUR 43,13 
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    Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford University Press Inc, US, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

    • Tapa dura

    Librería: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Reino UnidoRarewaves.com UK

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 160,76

    Envío por EUR 75,83 
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    Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles

    Hardback. Condición: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.

  • Editorial: BOM DIA BOA TARDE BOA NOITE; 1. Edition (1. Oktober 2013), 2013

    • Tapa blanda

    Librería: BOOKIT!, Genève, SuizaBOOKIT!

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    Condición: Usado - Como Nuevo

    EUR 40,00

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles

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    Condición: Used: Like New. Softcover condition new 6 folded posters 9783943514223.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Heidelberg University Aug 2024, 2024

    3968222016 / 9783968222011

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    Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, AlemaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 76,00

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    Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Digital Stylistics is an area of research at the intersection of Literary Studies, Linguistics, Digital Humanities, and Computational Literary Studies. It is concerned with the computational and statistical analysis of literary style and of style in language use. This volume brings together research in Digital Stylistics from Romance Studies and beyond, contributing to new methods and applications in different language contexts and literatures. All the research results are based on the empirical, computational analysis of literary corpora chosen to analyze major genres or subgenres of poetry, drama, and prose from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. 324 pp. Englisch.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Oxford Univ Pr, 2015

    019973402X / 9780199734023

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    Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 94,93

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    Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles

    Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Heidelberg University Publishing, Heidelberg University Publishing Aug 2024, 2024

    3968222016 / 9783968222011

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    Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemaniabuchversandmimpf2000

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    EUR 76,00

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    Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Digital Stylistics is an area of research at the intersection of LiteraryStudies, Linguistics, Digital Humanities, and Computational Literary Studies. It isconcerned with the computational and statistical analysis of literary style and ofstyle in language use. This volume brings together research in Digital Stylisticsfrom Romance Studies and beyond, contributing to new methods and applications indifferent language contexts and literatures. All the research results are based onthe empirical, computational analysis of literary corpora chosen to analyze majorgenres or subgenres of poetry, drama, and prose from the nineteenth to thetwenty-first century.CrossAsia E-Publishing, Plöck 107-109, 69047 Heidelberg, Neckar 328 pp. Englisch.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Heidelberg University Publishing, 2024

    3968222016 / 9783968222011

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    Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 76,00

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    Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Digital Stylistics is an area of research at the intersection of Literary Studies, Linguistics, Digital Humanities, and Computational Literary Studies. It is concerned with the computational and statistical analysis of literary style and of style in language use. This volume brings together research in Digital Stylistics from Romance Studies and beyond, contributing to new methods and applications in different language contexts and literatures. All the research results are based on the empirical, computational analysis of literary corpora chosen to analyze major genres or subgenres of poetry, drama, and prose from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century.

  • Idioma: Inglés

    Editorial: Universität Heidelberg, 2024

    3968222016 / 9783968222011

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    Librería: preigu, Osnabrück, Alemaniapreigu

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    Condición: Nuevo

    EUR 76,00

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    Cantidad disponible: 5 disponibles

    Buch. Condición: Neu. Digital Stylistics in Romance Studies and Beyond | Robert Hesselbach (u. a.) | Buch | Englisch | 2024 | Universität Heidelberg | EAN 9783968222011 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.