9781399010382 - the role of intelligence in the battle of britain de ridley, norman (30 resultados)
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Condición: New. Hardback 288 pages Published Price £25 The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a âwar of attritionâ, it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a… significant role on both sides.In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Commandâs operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffeâs Intelligence chief, Major Josef âBeppoâ Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Commandâs capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Gà ringâs decision-making at all stages of the conflict.Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each otherâs war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a âforce multiplierâ, by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a âforce diluterâ, thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role…on both sides. In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe. The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny. AUTHOR: Norman Ridley, an Open University Honours Graduate, sold his business and retired to devote himself to a study of the less well covered aspects of the Battle of Britain. He lives in the Channel Islands, surrounded by his family, and is a regular contributor to local media. The author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
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Hardback. Condición: New. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role on both side…s.In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict.Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe.The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny.
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Hardback. Condición: New. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role on both side…s.In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict.Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe.The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny.
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Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 263 pages. 9.25x6.50x1.00 inches. In Stock.
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Hardcover. Condición: New. Estado de la sobrecubierta: New. 1st Edition. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to inte…lligence played a significant role on both sides. In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe. The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny. Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. Book.
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Hardcover. Condición: New. Estado de la sobrecubierta: New. 1st Edition. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to inte…lligence played a significant role on both sides. In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe. The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny. Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. Book.
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Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defense. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role on bot…h sides.In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavors during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Göring's decision-making at all stages of the conflict.Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications.It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe.The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role…on both sides. In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe. The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny. AUTHOR: Norman Ridley, an Open University Honours Graduate, sold his business and retired to devote himself to a study of the less well covered aspects of the Battle of Britain. He lives in the Channel Islands, surrounded by his family, and is a regular contributor to local media. The author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role…on both sides. In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict. Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe. The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny. AUTHOR: Norman Ridley, an Open University Honours Graduate, sold his business and retired to devote himself to a study of the less well covered aspects of the Battle of Britain. He lives in the Channel Islands, surrounded by his family, and is a regular contributor to local media. The author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
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Hardback. Condición: New. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role on both side…s.In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict.Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe.The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny.
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Condición: New. The author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain.Über den AutorNorman Ridley is an Open University Honours graduate and a writer on inter-war intellige.
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Buch. Condición: Neu. The Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Britain | Norman Ridley | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2021 | Pen & Sword Books Ltd | EAN 9781399010382 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.
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Hardback. Condición: New. The Battle of Britain was fought between two airborne military elites and was a classic example of pure attack against pure defence. Though it was essentially a 'war of attrition', it was an engagement in which the gathering, assessment and reaction to intelligence played a significant role on both side…s.In some respects, both the RAF and the Luftwaffe were hamstrung in their endeavours during the Battle of Britain by poor intelligence. The most egregious Luftwaffe blunder was its failure to appreciate the true nature of Fighter Command's operational systems and consequently it made fundamental strategic errors when evaluating its plans to degrade them. This was compounded by the Luftwaffe's Intelligence chief, Major Josef 'Beppo' Schmid, whose consistent underestimation of Fighter Command's capabilities had a huge negative impact upon Reichsmarschall Goering's decision-making at all stages of the conflict.Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF lacked detailed information about each other's war production capacity. While the Luftwaffe did have the benefit of pre-war aerial surveillance data it had been unable to update it significantly since the declaration of war in September 1939. Fighter Command did have an distinct advantage through its radar surveillance systems, but this was, in the early stages of the conflict at least, less than totally reliable and it was often difficult to interpret the data coming through due to the inexperience of many of its operators. Another promising source of intelligence was the interception of Luftwaffe communications. It is clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to use intelligence as a 'force multiplier', by concentrating resources effectively, and actually fell into a negative spiral where poor intelligence acted as a 'force diluter', thus wasting resources in strategically questionable areas. The British, despite being essentially unable to predict enemy intentions, did have the means, however imperfect, to respond quickly and effectively to each new strategic initiative rolled out by the Luftwaffe.The result of three years intensive research, in this book the author analyses the way in which both the British and German Intelligence services played a part in the Battle of Britain, thereby attempting to throw light on an aspect of the battle that has been hitherto underexposed to scrutiny.
