Krstic vladimir (28 resultados)

Condición: good. Befriedigend/Good: Durchschnittlich erhaltenes Buch bzw. Schutzumschlag mit Gebrauchsspuren, aber vollständigen Seiten. / Describes the average WORN book or dust jacket that has all the pages present. Krstic, Vladimir (ilustrador).

Condición: very good. Gut/Very good: Buch bzw. Schutzumschlag mit wenigen Gebrauchsspuren an Einband, Schutzumschlag oder Seiten. / Describes a book or dust jacket that does show some signs of wear on either the binding, dust jacket or pages. Krstic, Vladimir (ilustrador).

Paperback or Softback. Condición: New. Deception and Self-Deception. Book.

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.…

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 80 pages. 6.00x0.17x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 80 pages. 6.00x0.17x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Condición: Fine. Très bon état. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Fine.

Condición: Very Good. Bon état -. quelques marques de lecture et/ou de stodckage sur couverture et coins mais du reste en bon état - envoi rapide et soigné dans enveloppe à bulles depuis france. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Very Good.

Condición: Very Good. Bon état. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Very Good.

Condición: Fine. Très bon état - légères marques de lecture et/ou de stockage mais du reste en très bon état- expédié soigneusement depuis la France. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Fine.

Condición: As New. Comme neuf - livre issu de destockage - pouvant présenter d'infimes traces de stockage - Expédié soigneusement dans emballage adapté. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. As New.

Hardback. Condición: New. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.…

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.…

Condición: New.

Original Wraps. Condición: Very Good. First Edition. FIRST EDITION. Original perfect bound oversized wraps (softcover). Numerous full color wraps. No previous owner's names, not exlibrary. Overall in VERY GOOD condition. Size: Folio - over 12" - 15" tall. Paperback.

Hardback. Condición: New. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.…

Editions Soleil / Collection 1800 de 2020. In-4 cartonnage éditeur de 92 pages chacun au format 29,5 x 21 cm. Couverture illustrée. Dos carré. Plats et intérieur frais. Superbes illustrations en couleurs de Vladimir Krstic et Laci sur scénario de Sylvain Cordurié. Edition complète qui réunit les 2 volumes de la série. Etat de neuf.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. …

Condición: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 60 | Sprache: Französisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. …

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. …

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. …

Condición: New. Print on Demand.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. …

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. …