9781839998690 - paradoxes of rationality, probability, and utility: slaying decision theory's dragons de marinoff, lou (20 resultados)
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Hardback. Condición: New. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Envelopes Proble…mThis unique anthology reflects the author's resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One treats the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). It disproves Axelrod's and Hamilton's landmark but mistaken claim (Science, 1981) that Rapoport's legendary Tit-for-Tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy and introduces a family of optimal strategies for iterated computer tournaments. Their members maximize expected utilities, embodying the properties of provocability, forgiveness, and exploitiveness. The leading member outperforms Tit-for-Tat. However, members of this family surprisingly fail to perform well against their own twins and siblings, thus reinforcing Axelrod's lemma that there is no "best" strategy for iterated PDs independent of the competing population.Part Two decouples Newcomb's problem from Braess's paradox, the Cohen-Kelly queuing paradox, and the PD, thus illustrating (contra Irvine, 1993) that Braess's paradox does not resolve Newcomb's problem. It then describes an innovative experiment with rationality in cyberspace, analogous to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. The experiment shows that ostensibly "rational" actors consistently make irrational choices, even (and sometimes especially) when their irrationality is revealed to them. Part Two concludes with a computer model that reveals why some players always defect in non-cooperative games, holding implications for social and political stability. The model shows that even an initial majority of 67% cooperators can degenerate into a 100% non-cooperative population, while higher initial percentages of cooperators can maintain majority cooperation yet must still endure "resistant" nuclei of permanently defecting players.Part Three presents a (1994) resolution of Bertrand's random chord paradox, which still stands among the most convincing treatments since the problem was originally posed in 1889. A recent noteworthy challenge (Shackel, 2024) is summarized with a response. Part Three then dissects divergent solutions by Elga and Lewis to the perplexing Sleeping Beauty problem, presenting new arguments against Elga's solution that decide the issue in favor of Lewis. Part Three ends by decisively resolving the notorious Two Envelopes paradox-still hotly debated after more than 30 years-by exposing a fundamental and fatal mis-application of the Principle of Indifference.Part Four takes up a moral question debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant-"Should one lie to a highway robber to gain one's release?"-and in so.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Enve…lopes ProblemThis unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perennially perplexing and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One features treatments of the Prisoner's Dilemma, illustrating why there is no objectively 'best strategy' in nature and nurture alike. Part Two treats Newcomb's problem, along with potential failures of misguided 'collective' rationality in non-cooperative multi-player games. Part Three examines pillars and pitfalls of the widely applied and often mis-applied Principle of Indifference, while resolving Bertrand's notorious random chord paradox, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, and the Two Envelopes Problem Part Four presents a thorny moral dilemma debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant, namely, the ethics of redeeming oneself from a highway robber via the expedient of lying. Part Four then introduces a 'reverse Turing test' that leads to a refutation of the Strong AI thesis. It concludes with a methodological comparison of solutions by an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician to an old Cambridge challenge puzzle, while shedding new light on a humorous but ontologically impossible solution by Dirac. This unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems in decision theory. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
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Hardback. Condición: New. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Envelopes Proble…mThis unique anthology reflects the author's resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One treats the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). It disproves Axelrod's and Hamilton's landmark but mistaken claim (Science, 1981) that Rapoport's legendary Tit-for-Tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy and introduces a family of optimal strategies for iterated computer tournaments. Their members maximize expected utilities, embodying the properties of provocability, forgiveness, and exploitiveness. The leading member outperforms Tit-for-Tat. However, members of this family surprisingly fail to perform well against their own twins and siblings, thus reinforcing Axelrod's lemma that there is no "best" strategy for iterated PDs independent of the competing population.Part Two decouples Newcomb's problem from Braess's paradox, the Cohen-Kelly queuing paradox, and the PD, thus illustrating (contra Irvine, 1993) that Braess's paradox does not resolve Newcomb's problem. It then describes an innovative experiment with rationality in cyberspace, analogous to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. The experiment shows that ostensibly "rational" actors consistently make irrational choices, even (and sometimes especially) when their irrationality is revealed to them. Part Two concludes with a computer model that reveals why some players always defect in non-cooperative games, holding implications for social and political stability. The model shows that even an initial majority of 67% cooperators can degenerate into a 100% non-cooperative population, while higher initial percentages of cooperators can maintain majority cooperation yet must still endure "resistant" nuclei of permanently defecting players.Part Three presents a (1994) resolution of Bertrand's random chord paradox, which still stands among the most convincing treatments since the problem was originally posed in 1889. A recent noteworthy challenge (Shackel, 2024) is summarized with a response. Part Three then dissects divergent solutions by Elga and Lewis to the perplexing Sleeping Beauty problem, presenting new arguments against Elga's solution that decide the issue in favor of Lewis. Part Three ends by decisively resolving the notorious Two Envelopes paradox-still hotly debated after more than 30 years-by exposing a fundamental and fatal mis-application of the Principle of Indifference.Part Four takes up a moral question debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant-"Should one lie to a highway robber to gain one's release?"-and in so.
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Hardback. Condición: New. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Envelopes Proble…mThis unique anthology reflects the author's resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One treats the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). It disproves Axelrod's and Hamilton's landmark but mistaken claim (Science, 1981) that Rapoport's legendary Tit-for-Tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy and introduces a family of optimal strategies for iterated computer tournaments. Their members maximize expected utilities, embodying the properties of provocability, forgiveness, and exploitiveness. The leading member outperforms Tit-for-Tat. However, members of this family surprisingly fail to perform well against their own twins and siblings, thus reinforcing Axelrod's lemma that there is no "best" strategy for iterated PDs independent of the competing population.Part Two decouples Newcomb's problem from Braess's paradox, the Cohen-Kelly queuing paradox, and the PD, thus illustrating (contra Irvine, 1993) that Braess's paradox does not resolve Newcomb's problem. It then describes an innovative experiment with rationality in cyberspace, analogous to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. The experiment shows that ostensibly "rational" actors consistently make irrational choices, even (and sometimes especially) when their irrationality is revealed to them. Part Two concludes with a computer model that reveals why some players always defect in non-cooperative games, holding implications for social and political stability. The model shows that even an initial majority of 67% cooperators can degenerate into a 100% non-cooperative population, while higher initial percentages of cooperators can maintain majority cooperation yet must still endure "resistant" nuclei of permanently defecting players.Part Three presents a (1994) resolution of Bertrand's random chord paradox, which still stands among the most convincing treatments since the problem was originally posed in 1889. A recent noteworthy challenge (Shackel, 2024) is summarized with a response. Part Three then dissects divergent solutions by Elga and Lewis to the perplexing Sleeping Beauty problem, presenting new arguments against Elga's solution that decide the issue in favor of Lewis. Part Three ends by decisively resolving the notorious Two Envelopes paradox-still hotly debated after more than 30 years-by exposing a fundamental and fatal mis-application of the Principle of Indifference.Part Four takes up a moral question debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant-"Should one lie to a highway robber to gain one's release?"-and in so.
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Hardback. Condición: New. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Envelopes Proble…mThis unique anthology reflects the author's resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One treats the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). It disproves Axelrod's and Hamilton's landmark but mistaken claim (Science, 1981) that Rapoport's legendary Tit-for-Tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy and introduces a family of optimal strategies for iterated computer tournaments. Their members maximize expected utilities, embodying the properties of provocability, forgiveness, and exploitiveness. The leading member outperforms Tit-for-Tat. However, members of this family surprisingly fail to perform well against their own twins and siblings, thus reinforcing Axelrod's lemma that there is no "best" strategy for iterated PDs independent of the competing population.Part Two decouples Newcomb's problem from Braess's paradox, the Cohen-Kelly queuing paradox, and the PD, thus illustrating (contra Irvine, 1993) that Braess's paradox does not resolve Newcomb's problem. It then describes an innovative experiment with rationality in cyberspace, analogous to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. The experiment shows that ostensibly "rational" actors consistently make irrational choices, even (and sometimes especially) when their irrationality is revealed to them. Part Two concludes with a computer model that reveals why some players always defect in non-cooperative games, holding implications for social and political stability. The model shows that even an initial majority of 67% cooperators can degenerate into a 100% non-cooperative population, while higher initial percentages of cooperators can maintain majority cooperation yet must still endure "resistant" nuclei of permanently defecting players.Part Three presents a (1994) resolution of Bertrand's random chord paradox, which still stands among the most convincing treatments since the problem was originally posed in 1889. A recent noteworthy challenge (Shackel, 2024) is summarized with a response. Part Three then dissects divergent solutions by Elga and Lewis to the perplexing Sleeping Beauty problem, presenting new arguments against Elga's solution that decide the issue in favor of Lewis. Part Three ends by decisively resolving the notorious Two Envelopes paradox-still hotly debated after more than 30 years-by exposing a fundamental and fatal mis-application of the Principle of Indifference.Part Four takes up a moral question debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant-"Should one lie to a highway robber to gain one's release?"-and in so.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Enve…lopes ProblemThis unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perennially perplexing and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One features treatments of the Prisoner's Dilemma, illustrating why there is no objectively 'best strategy' in nature and nurture alike. Part Two treats Newcomb's problem, along with potential failures of misguided 'collective' rationality in non-cooperative multi-player games. Part Three examines pillars and pitfalls of the widely applied and often mis-applied Principle of Indifference, while resolving Bertrand's notorious random chord paradox, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, and the Two Envelopes Problem Part Four presents a thorny moral dilemma debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant, namely, the ethics of redeeming oneself from a highway robber via the expedient of lying. Part Four then introduces a 'reverse Turing test' that leads to a refutation of the Strong AI thesis. It concludes with a methodological comparison of solutions by an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician to an old Cambridge challenge puzzle, while shedding new light on a humorous but ontologically impossible solution by Dirac. This unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems in decision theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
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Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perennially perplexing and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his… research and publications in these related fields. Part One features treatments of the Prisoner's Dilemma, illustrating why there is no objectively 'best strategy' in nature and nurture alike. Part Two treats Newcomb's problem, along with potential failures of misguided 'collective' rationality in non-cooperative multi-player games. Part Three examines pillars and pitfalls of the widely applied and often mis-applied Principle of Indifference, while resolving Bertrand's notorious random chord paradox, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, and the Two Envelopes Problem Part Four models a thorny moral dilemma debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant, namely, the ethics of redeeming oneself from a highway robber via the expedient of lying. Part Four then introduces a 'reverse Turing test' that leads to a refutation of the Strong AI thesis. It concludes with a methodological comparison of solutions by an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician to an old Cambridge challenge puzzle, while shedding new light on a humorous but ontologically impossible solution by Dirac.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. An anthology that presents 25 years of Lou Marinoff's work addressing foundational paradoxes and dilemmas in rational choice, probability, and utility theory, offering original analyses of and/or resolutions to classic problems like the Prisoner's Dilemma, Newcomb's Problem, and the Two Enve…lopes ProblemThis unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perennially perplexing and widely discussed problems arising in rational choice theory, probability theory, and utility theory. It spans 25 years of his research and publications in these related fields. Part One features treatments of the Prisoner's Dilemma, illustrating why there is no objectively 'best strategy' in nature and nurture alike. Part Two treats Newcomb's problem, along with potential failures of misguided 'collective' rationality in non-cooperative multi-player games. Part Three examines pillars and pitfalls of the widely applied and often mis-applied Principle of Indifference, while resolving Bertrand's notorious random chord paradox, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, and the Two Envelopes Problem Part Four presents a thorny moral dilemma debated by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Kant, namely, the ethics of redeeming oneself from a highway robber via the expedient of lying. Part Four then introduces a 'reverse Turing test' that leads to a refutation of the Strong AI thesis. It concludes with a methodological comparison of solutions by an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician to an old Cambridge challenge puzzle, while shedding new light on a humorous but ontologically impossible solution by Dirac. This unique anthology reflects the author's analyses and/or resolutions of some of the most perplexing, interesting, and widely discussed problems in decision theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
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Buch. Condición: Neu. Paradoxes of Rationality, Probability, and Utility | Slaying Decision Theory's Dragons | Lou Marinoff | Buch | Englisch | 2026 | Anthem Press | EAN 9781839998690 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.
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