9781636244266 - Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War de Benson, Kevin C M; Brooks, Vincent (29 resultados)

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: As New. Like New condition. Like New dust jacket. A near perfect copy that may have very minor cosmetic defects.

Condición: very_good. Gently read. May have name of previous ownership, or ex-library edition. Binding tight; spine straight and smooth, with no creasing; covers clean and crisp. Minimal signs of handling or shelving. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships USPS Media Mail.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. A unique first-hand account of the planning and execution of the opening campaign in the invasion of Iraq. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003. He addresses the persistent trope that the Army did no planning for Phase IV, revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the smoking gun of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings. AUTHOR: Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine. An insiders account of how, contrary to popular belief, the U.S. Army developed comprehensive plans for the initial invasion of Iraq and for subsequent stages of the conflictplans that were received with little interest by Washington. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Brand New.

hardcover. Condición: New. *Brand new* Ships from USA.

hardcover. Condición: Fine.

hardcover. Condición: Very Good.

Hardback. Condición: New. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.He addresses the persistent trope that "the Army did no planning" for "Phase IV," revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the "smoking gun" of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.

Hardback. Condición: New. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.He addresses the persistent trope that "the Army did no planning" for "Phase IV," revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the "smoking gun" of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.

Condición: NEW.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: new.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: New.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 304 pages. 9.00x6.00x9.30 inches. In Stock.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. A unique first-hand account of the planning and execution of the opening campaign in the invasion of Iraq. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003. He addresses the persistent trope that the Army did no planning for Phase IV, revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the smoking gun of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings. AUTHOR: Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine. An insiders account of how, contrary to popular belief, the U.S. Army developed comprehensive plans for the initial invasion of Iraq and for subsequent stages of the conflictplans that were received with little interest by Washington. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Condición: New. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.He addresses the persistent trope that "the Army did no planning" for "Phase IV," revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the "smoking gun" of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. A unique first-hand account of the planning and execution of the opening campaign in the invasion of Iraq. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003. He addresses the persistent trope that the Army did no planning for Phase IV, revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the smoking gun of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings. AUTHOR: Kevin Benson served in the US Army as a commander and general staff officer for 30 years. He was the Director of Plans for Third U.S. Army and the Combined Forces Land Component Command at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, from July 2002 to July 2003. His final assignment in the US Army was Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He writes for professional journals and web sites ranging from Parameters, Military Review, and ARMY magazine to Strategy Bridge and the Modern War Institute. He reviews books for ARMY magazine. An insiders account of how, contrary to popular belief, the U.S. Army developed comprehensive plans for the initial invasion of Iraq and for subsequent stages of the conflictplans that were received with little interest by Washington. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condición: NEW.

Hardback. Condición: New. Given the length of time the United States spent in Iraq, there is a perception that there was no consideration before the war of what should be done after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein. However as this unofficial history reveals, there was a great deal of planning to address how to achieve the policy objectives for Iraq set by the Bush administration. Kevin Benson-director of plans for the United States Third Army, the ground forces command headquarters for GEN Franks' Central Command, at the start of the war-details the development of the invasion plan and its subsequent execution from D-Day in March 2003 until the change of command of operations in Iraq and the departure of Third Army in June 2003.He addresses the persistent trope that "the Army did no planning" for "Phase IV," revealing that extensive plans were proposed, and were met with very little interest in Washington. The book covers the difficulties encountered in dealing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from getting his approval on the number of forces requested to conducting the campaign to find the "smoking gun" of WMD; the instructions given to Army, Marine and coalition forces; and the daily secure video teleconferences with Central Command and the Pentagon, and the rather remarkable conversations and guidance that came from these meetings.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - An insider's account of how, contrary to popular belief, the U.S. Army developed comprehensive plans for the initial invasion of Iraq and for subsequent stages of the conflict--plans that were received with little interest by Washington.