9781032914091 - Nuclear Alliance Restraint: Success and Failure in Countering Allied Proliferators (Routledge Global Security Studies) de Lee, Dong Sun; Alexandrova, Iordanka (14 resultados)

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. 2026. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . .

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 184 pages. 6.14x0.42x9.21 inches. In Stock.

Condición: New. 2026. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condición: New. Dong Sun Lee is a Professor of International Relations at Korea University, Seoul, South Korea. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is the author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and Internat.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.