Isbn: 9781032914015 - nuclear alliance restraint: success and failure in countering allied proliferators (routledge global security studies) (17 resultados)

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Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices
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Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices
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Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino UnidoGreatBookPricesUK
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Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino UnidoGreatBookPricesUK
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Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaPBShop.store US
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Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino UnidoPBShop.store UK
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Librería: California Books, Miami, FL, Estados Unidos de AmericaCalifornia Books
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EUR 266,74
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Librería: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, IrlandaKennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd.
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EUR 244,49
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Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino UnidoRia Christie Collections
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EUR 267,61
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Condición: New. In English.

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Librería: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Reino UnidoRarewaves.com USA
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EUR 290,81
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Hardback. Condición: New. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.…

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Librería: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaKennys Bookstore
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EUR 313,00
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Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books
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EUR 326,02
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Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 208 pages. 9.18x6.12x9.21 inches. In Stock.

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Librería: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Reino UnidoRarewaves.com UK
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EUR 285,37
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Hardback. Condición: New. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.…

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Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, AlemaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.
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EUR 180,00
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Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. 200 pp. Englisch.…

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Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino UnidoCitiRetail
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EUR 165,86
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
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EUR 204,67
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Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.…

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Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemaniamoluna
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EUR 190,01
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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Dong Sun Lee is a Professor of International Relations at Korea University, Seoul, South Korea. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is the author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and Internat.…