ISBN: 9780199534654 - being for: evaluating the semantic program of expressivism (25 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Very Good. 1st Edition. A highly respectable copy with pristine text and no inscriptions or labels (just an erased pencil marking on front endpaper). There is a light hint of foxing to top edge of text block only. The black cloth boards have a tiny nudge to lower front tip else in excellent shape with no wear to binding. The dust wrapper has some surface wear but no nicks or tears - overall very presentable. Please see five pictures attached.…

Condición: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. Clean from markings. In good all round condition. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,500grams, ISBN:9780199534654.…

hardcover. Condición: Very Good.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. Mark Schroeder explores the semantic commitments of metaethical expressivism, the heir to the noncognitivist theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. He shows how to solve many of the open problems facing expressivism, but this only highlights further and deeper problems for the view. Expressivism, he argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. Num Pages: 214 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: CFA; HPQ. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 222 x 145 x 20. Weight in Grams: 402. . 2008. Hardback. . . . . …

Condición: New.

Condición: New. Mark Schroeder explores the semantic commitments of metaethical expressivism, the heir to the noncognitivist theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. He shows how to solve many of the open problems facing expressivism, but this only highlights further and deeper problems for the view. Expressivism, he argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. Num Pages: 214 pages, Illustrations. BIC Classification: CFA; HPQ. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 222 x 145 x 20. Weight in Grams: 402. . 2008. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Hardback. Condición: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. In English.

Hardback. Condición: New. Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed to solve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is.Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understanding of the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructive expressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false.…

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 214 pages. 8.50x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condición: New. Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed to solve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is.Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understanding of the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructive expressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false.…

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and evenquantifiers.Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed tosolve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is.Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understandingof the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructiveexpressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. Mark Schroeder explores the semantic commitments of metaethical expressivism, the heir to the noncognitivist theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. He shows how to solve many of the open problems facing expressivism, but this only highlights further and deeper problems for the view. Expressivism, he argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and evenquantifiers.Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed tosolve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is.Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understandingof the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructiveexpressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. Mark Schroeder explores the semantic commitments of metaethical expressivism, the heir to the noncognitivist theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. He shows how to solve many of the open problems facing expressivism, but this only highlights further and deeper problems for the view. Expressivism, he argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. xvi + 197 Illus.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. xvi + 197.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. xvi + 197.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and evenquantifiers.Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed tosolve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is.Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understandingof the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructiveexpressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. Mark Schroeder explores the semantic commitments of metaethical expressivism, the heir to the noncognitivist theories of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare. He shows how to solve many of the open problems facing expressivism, but this only highlights further and deeper problems for the view. Expressivism, he argues, is coherent and interesting, but false. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been very far developed. As argued within, expressivists have not yet even managed to solve the 'negation problem' - to explain why atomic normative sentences are inconsistent with their negations. As a result, it is far from clear that expressivism even could be true, let alone whether it is.Being For seeks to evaluate the semantic commitments of expressivism, by showing how an expressivist semantics would work, what it can do, and what kind of assumptions would be required, in order for it to do it. Building on a highly general understanding of the basic ideas of expressivism, it argues that expressivists can solve the negation problem - but only in one kind of way. It shows how this insight paves the way for an explanatorily powerful, constructive expressivist semantics, which solves many of what have been taken to be the deepest problems for expressivism. But it also argues that no account with these advantages can be generalized to deal with constructions like tense, modals, or binary quantifiers. Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false.…