Rainer strauch rolf (23 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Shipped within 24 hours from our UK warehouse. Clean, undamaged book with no damage to pages and minimal wear to the cover. Spine still tight, in very good condition. Remember if you are not happy, you are covered by our 100% money back guarantee.

Hardcover. Condición: Très bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Couverture différente. Edition 2009. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Different cover. Edition 2009. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. …

Hardcover. Condición: Like New. First Edition. Firm, square and tight with sharp corners and sturdy hinges, just showing a few minor rubs and some mild cosmetic wear. Hence a non-text page is stamped 'damaged'. Despite such this book is in nearly new condition. Thus the contents are crisp, fresh and clean. Offered for sale at a very sensible price.…

Broschur. Condición: sehr gut. IV, 218 S., 21 cm. Sprache: deu.

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.…

Condición: New. In English.

TAPA DURA. Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.…

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condición: gut. Fiscal Governance in Europe (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) In englischer Sprache. pages.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 246 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 246.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 246.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance dep.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 246 Illus.

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance dep. …