Fiscal Governance in Europe
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Mark Hallerberg is Professor of Public Management and Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance. He also maintains an affiliation with the Political Science department at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. He has published widely on fiscal governance, tax competition, exchange rate choice and European politics. He has held academic positions previously at Emory University, the University of Pittsburgh and the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has also served as a visiting scholar at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Bonn, the University of Mannheim and the University of Munich (all in economics departments). He has done consulting work for the Dutch Ministry of Finance, Ernst and Young, Poland, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank.
Rolf Rainer Strauch is Adviser in the Directorate General Economics at the European Central Bank, Frankfurt, Germany. He previously worked at the Deutsche Bundesbank. He has been a consultant to the OECD, the European Commission and the Dutch Ministry of Finance. He has also published widely in the area of public economics and European integration.
Jürgen von Hagen is Professor of Economics at the University of Bonn, Germany. He previously taught at the University of Mannheim and at Indiana University, where he maintains an affiliation with the Kelley School of Business. Von Hagen is a Research Fellow of CEPR, London, and a member of the Academic Advisory Council of the Federal Minister of Economics and Technology in Germany and served as a member of the French Commite Economique de la Nation. He has been a consultant to the IMF, the World Bank, the Federal Reserve Board, the European Commission, the ECB and numerous governments in Europe and beyond. Von Hagen has published widely in the areas of macroeconomics and public economics.
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Paperback. Condición: New. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. Nº de ref. del artículo: LU-9780521138260
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Condición: New. Based on data from European Union countries, this book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 246 pages, 5 b/w illus. 45 tables. BIC Classification: 1D; 1QFE; JPB; KCL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 230 x 147 x 15. Weight in Grams: 390. . 2010. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. Nº de ref. del artículo: V9780521138260
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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9780521138260
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