Preble keith a (23 resultados)

hardcover. Condición: Fine.

hardcover. Condición: Good. Cover and edges may have some wear.

hardcover. Condición: Fine.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Condición: New. The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states' goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international "pariah states," countries who violate various international norms? This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states' trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states' trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmar's) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states' behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the "right" sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions.…

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 212 pages. 9.01x6.01x9.30 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condición: New. The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states' goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international "pariah states," countries who violate various international norms? This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states' trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states' trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmar's) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states' behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the "right" sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Piccole guide | Preposizioni (in B&W) | Keith Preble (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2018 | [.] | EAN 9781387827473 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Exercise Supplement | Preposizioni (in B&W) | Keith Preble (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2018 | [.] | EAN 9781387839896 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Il vero italiano 2 | Practice Makes Perfect | Keith Preble (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Deutsch | 2015 | [.] | EAN 9781312669383 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Piccole guide | Preposizioni (Prepositions) | Keith Preble (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2017 | [.] | EAN 9781329668621 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Exercise Supplement | Preposizioni | Keith Preble (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2017 | [.] | EAN 9781365891274 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international pariah states, countries who violate various international norms? This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmars) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the right sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions. This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states trading network. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, the authors argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions; sanctions imposed by the right sender states can be successful. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. …

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international pariah states, countries who violate various international norms? This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmars) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the right sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions. This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states trading network. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, the authors argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions; sanctions imposed by the right sender states can be successful. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. …

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Il vero italiano | Your Guide To Speaking "Real" Italian | Keith Preble (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2016 | [.] | EAN 9781312595675 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…

Buch. Condición: Neu. Trading with Pariahs | Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions | Keith A. Preble (u. a.) | Buch | Englisch | 2024 | Lexington Books | EAN 9781666903737 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - The past few decades have witnessed a proliferation of economic sanctions, yet there seem to be few examples of sanctions meeting sender states' goals. Under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international 'pariah states,' countries who violate various international norms This book examines the impact of economic sanctions on target states' trading relationships through social network analysis, a method that has rarely been applied to the study of sanctions. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states' trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmar's) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states' behavior depends on who imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the 'right' sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions.…