Pomeroy jim (37 resultados)

Hardback. Condición: Good. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War.

Condición: good. Fast & Free Shipping â" Good condition. It may show normal signs of use, such as light writing, highlighting, or library markings, but all pages are intact and the book is fully readable. A solid, complete copy that's ready to enjoy.

Hardback. Condición: Good. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War.

Condición: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Paperback. Condición: Very Good. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

Softcover. Condición: Very Good+. Light wear to covers. ; Clean and tight. Color photos, comprehensive text. Due to size, ships within US only and only by media rate mail. ; Small 4to 9" - 11" tall; 210 pp.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War. The People's Army of Vietnamese's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi. As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War. As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach detente with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed Easter Offensive in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon. AUTHOR: Jim Pomeroy has a BA in History & Political Science from James Madison University and a Master's in History with a Master's Certificate in Strategic Studies from Texas Tech University. He has also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressional staffer. He currently lives in Roanoke, VA. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Brand New.

Condición: New.

Hardback. Condición: New. The People's Army of Vietnam's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach "détente" with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed "Easter Offensive" in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon. …

paperback. Condición: New. *Brand new* Ships from USA.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Soft cover. Condición: Very good. No jacket. Great condition. Inside is clean and unmarked.

Hardback. Condición: New. The People's Army of Vietnam's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach "détente" with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed "Easter Offensive" in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon. …

Condición: Very good. - Small quarto [approximately 8-1/2 inches square], softcover bound in pictorial wrappers. The wraps are very lightly bumped with some minor soiling to the front wrap & with a mailing label on the rear wrap. [18] pages, including inside wraps. Photographic illustrations in color and black & white. There is a minor ink mark to the margin of 1 page. Very good. Light Work, director Jeffrey Hoone, associate director Gina Murtagh, supports photographers and fosters the appreciation and understanding of photographic arts in Central New York through a grant program, an artist-in-residence program, exhibitions and the publication "Contact Sheet".…

First Edition. First edition. Small oblong softcover. Features text by Jeffrey Hoone and Amy Hufnagel. Includes color and black and white images by Keith Piper, Sharon Stewart, Biff Henrich, Mona Jimenez, Patti Ambrogi, Tony Gleaton and Jim Pomeroy. A fine copy in stapled wrappers. Uncommon.

First Edition. First edition. Softcover. 10 pages. Exhibition catalog for a show that ran January 9-31, 1981. Features an introduction and acknowledgements Susan Krane and with the text of her interview of Pomeroy. Includes 2 images, list of previous exhibitions, list of selected performances, selected bibliography, list of public collections and commissions. A near fine copy in stapled wrappers and with laid in checklist but lacking the 3-D glasses. …

Softcover. Condición: Fine. Stapled gray wrappers lettered in white; 4 b&w photographs including 2 full page 3-D; glasses in plastic pouch attached inside front cover. One legal size printed checklist folded and laid in. ; Small 4to 9" - 11" tall; 10 pages.

Soft cover. Condición: Fine. No Jacket. quarto pamphlet unpaginated roughly 20 pages fine. two pamphlets in one binding. you can treat either end as the front cover Language: eng.

Softcover. Condición: Very Good. First Edition. First edition, softcover with French flaps, a pair of folded 3-D glasses is laid in, the book has a slight lean to the binding, a shallow pause in the text block where the glasses have been laid, light bumps to the spine ends and corners, a slight crease to the upper corner of about half of the pages, rubbing with a few small scrapes and smudges to the covers, and mild wear to the edges. Otherwise, this is a solid, tight, internally bright, Very Good copy.…

Softcover, 68 pages, very good condition, light rubbing to covers; no internal marks. 3-D glasses laid in.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War. The People's Army of Vietnamese's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi. As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War. As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach detente with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed Easter Offensive in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon. AUTHOR: Jim Pomeroy has a BA in History & Political Science from James Madison University and a Master's in History with a Master's Certificate in Strategic Studies from Texas Tech University. He has also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressional staffer. He currently lives in Roanoke, VA. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. First Printing. 22 8.5" x 11" pages strip bound in gray paper covers. Very Good with moderate wear to covers and no marks to text. BRC C1 Box ; 4to 11" - 13" tall; 22 pages.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 174 pages. 9.00x6.00x9.02 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condición: New. The People's Army of Vietnam's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach "détente" with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed "Easter Offensive" in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon. …

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War. The People's Army of Vietnamese's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi. As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War. As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach detente with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed Easter Offensive in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon. AUTHOR: Jim Pomeroy has a BA in History & Political Science from James Madison University and a Master's in History with a Master's Certificate in Strategic Studies from Texas Tech University. He has also worked in the U.S. House of Representatives as a Congressional staffer. He currently lives in Roanoke, VA. How diplomatic relations between North Vietnam and its benefactors, the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union, affected PAVN strategy and tactics during the Vietnam War. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Soft cover. Condición: Near Fine. 1st Edition. In excellent condition. 32 pages, softcover in stapled wraps, 9.75" by 8.5". Scarce split photo publication by avant-garde artists Pomeroy and Schorr, the book designed to be viewed in both directions, one showcasing Pomeroys's black and white photocollages, the other Schorr's 3D photomontages with floating texts. Scarce.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - 'Jim Pomeroy's Alliances & Armor bridges the gaps between Cold War diplomacy and military operational history. With a firm grasp of multi-archival and secondary sources, Pomeroy provides a comprehensive look at the international issues that influenced Hanoi's decisions in the Second Indochina War in a concise and deftly written narrative. This is a strong addition to the voluminous literature of the war in Vietnam.' -- Kelly Crager, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam ArchiveThe People's Army of Vietnam's decision to utilize armor as part of its warfighting strategy was a product of various geopolitical factors that surrounded Hanoi during various parts of the Vietnam War. During the First Indochina War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as the foremost communist benefactor of North Vietnam. The Soviet Union however, largely stood by. While worried by the PRC's and Soviet Union's actions during the Geneva Conference of 1954, Hanoi still felt the need to maintain good relations with both countries. This was reinforced when the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1956 and Hanoi was forced to walk a tight rope between Beijing and Moscow. As the United States escalated its war in Vietnam, Moscow (now under new leadership) sought to increase its material support for Hanoi.As the war progressed, Hanoi sought to fight larger battles against the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In order to fight larger battles, the PAVN needed more modern military equipment that only the Soviet Union could provide. This, paired with the chaos of the ongoing Cultural Revolution in China, led Hanoi to lean more towards Moscow in the latter years of the Vietnam War.As part of this newly blossomed relationship, Moscow began to furnish the PAVN with more modern weapons including Soviet armor. Initially, the PAVN's use of armor at Lang Vei (1968) and Laos (1971) was met with some success. However, in 1972, Hanoi panicked as the United States began to reach 'détente' with Beijing and Moscow. This led to fears of another Geneva and thus lead Hanoi to pursue a rushed 'Easter Offensive' in March 1972 which saw ill-trained PAVN tank crews fall prey to poor planning and bad strategy. This changed in 1975 when following the Paris Peace Accords and subsequent combined arms training in the Soviet Union, the PAVN victoriously drove its Soviet armor into Saigon.…

Wrappers. Condición: Very Good. Estado de la sobrecubierta: No Jacket, as issued. (San Francisco, CA). Square 8vo. Toning and slight fading to wrappers. Rubbing to wrappers. Slight edgewear to wrappers with rubbing along spine. Creases to rear wrapper panel. Toning to leaves. Leaves are becoming detached from front hinge, one of the staples attaching the wrapper to the text block has detached, the same incident is mirrored at the rear hinge. Good in wrappers.…

Soft cover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. From the private collection of photographer, John Running. 3 Reels. 21 3D photographs, and booklet. missing the Viewmaster and Box. The publication complements an installation/exhibition (Stereo Views) that was produced by Light Work and exhibited in Light Works' Robert B. Mensche Photography Gallery from January 10-February 13, 1988. In a plastic bag.…