Fatton lionel (41 resultados)

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Hardback. Condición: New. Japan has been moving toward a more independent security policy since the early 2010s, duplicating the military assets of the United States and reorganizing the Self-Defense Forces. In Japan's Awakening, Lionel P. Fatton and Oreste Foppiani argue that the country faces an entrapment-abandonment dilemma in which any attempt to prevent abandonment by the United States vis-à-vis China negatively affects its national security by heightening the risk of entrapment in the Korean Peninsula, and vice versa. A move toward autonomy is the only way for Japan to solve this dilemma. The subject is at variance with both the insistence on the constraining effect of domestic norms on Japan's security policy and the assumption of everlasting reliance on the United States for protection.…

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New. pp. 184.

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Hardback. Condición: New. Japan has been moving toward a more independent security policy since the early 2010s, duplicating the military assets of the United States and reorganizing the Self-Defense Forces. In Japan's Awakening, Lionel P. Fatton and Oreste Foppiani argue that the country faces an entrapment-abandonment dilemma in which any attempt to prevent abandonment by the United States vis-à-vis China negatively affects its national security by heightening the risk of entrapment in the Korean Peninsula, and vice versa. A move toward autonomy is the only way for Japan to solve this dilemma. The subject is at variance with both the insistence on the constraining effect of domestic norms on Japan's security policy and the assumption of everlasting reliance on the United States for protection.…

Condición: New. In English.

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book investigates the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of Japan's foreign policy during the interbellum. In the mid-1930s, Japan withdrew from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relationship between the two Pacific powers. Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Puzzling is the fact that the international environment in the Asia-Pacific was relatively stable in the mid-1930s, while Washington was pursuing a policy of accommodation toward Tokyo. By rejecting arms control and engaging in unfettered naval expansion, Japan overbalanced against the United States and began its rush to the Pacific War.The book explains Japan's overbalancing with a neoclassical realist model that combines the literatures on threat perception and civil-military relations. Amid the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933, as the Japanese government collaborated with the military institution to address the situation in China, military influence on the formulation of foreign policy surged. The perceptual and policy biases of the military, which include the tendency to distrust other countries' intentions, to adopt worst-case analyses of international dynamics and to strive to maximize military power, gradually penetrated the decision-making process. Dysfunctions in the preexisting structure of Japanese civil-military relations, engendered by an over-depoliticization of the military institution, allowed the navy to convince policymakers that the United States was inherently hostile to Japan, hence the necessity to prepare for war. The government was brainstormed, adopting the biased military perspective on international affairs. Japan overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.…

Condición: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Seiten: 340 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This book investigates the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of Japan¿s foreign policy during the interbellum. In the mid-1930s, Japan withdrew from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relationship between the two Pacific powers. Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Puzzling is the fact that the international environment in the Asia-Pacific was relatively stable in the mid-1930s, while Washington was pursuing a policy of accommodation toward Tokyo. By rejecting arms control and engaging in unfettered naval expansion, Japan overbalanced against the United States and began its rush to the Pacific War.The book explains Japan¿s overbalancing with a neoclassical realist model that combines the literatures on threat perception and civil-military relations. Amid the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933, as the Japanese government collaborated with the military institution to address the situation in China, military influence on the formulation of foreign policy surged. The perceptual and policy biases of the military, which include the tendency to distrust other countries¿ intentions, to adopt worst-case analyses of international dynamics and to strive to maximize military power, gradually penetrated the decision-making process. Dysfunctions in the preexisting structure of Japanese civil-military relations, engendered by an over-depoliticization of the military institution, allowed the navy to convince policymakers that the United States was inherently hostile to Japan, hence the necessity to prepare for war. The government was brainstormed, adopting the biased military perspective on international affairs. Japan overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.…

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Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book investigates the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of Japan's foreign policy during the interbellum. In the mid-1930s, Japan withdrew from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relationship between the two Pacific powers. Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Puzzling is the fact that the international environment in the Asia-Pacific was relatively stable in the mid-1930s, while Washington was pursuing a policy of accommodation toward Tokyo. By rejecting arms control and engaging in unfettered naval expansion, Japan overbalanced against the United States and began its rush to the Pacific War.The book explains Japan's overbalancing with a neoclassical realist model that combines the literatures on threat perception and civil-military relations. Amid the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933, as the Japanese government collaborated with the military institution to address the situation in China, military influence on the formulation of foreign policy surged. The perceptual and policy biases of the military, which include the tendency to distrust other countries' intentions, to adopt worst-case analyses of international dynamics and to strive to maximize military power, gradually penetrated the decision-making process. Dysfunctions in the preexisting structure of Japanese civil-military relations, engendered by an over-depoliticization of the military institution, allowed the navy to convince policymakers that the United States was inherently hostile to Japan, hence the necessity to prepare for war. The government was brainstormed, adopting the biased military perspective on international affairs. Japan overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.…

Condición: New. 2023rd edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 336 pages. 8.25x5.75x1.00 inches. In Stock.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Why did Japanese policy makers decide to attack the United States while aware of their very limited chance of success in war Historical facts indicate that the Japanese decision could be explained by the theoretical concept of preventive war: Japan decided to go to war in December 1941 in order to avoid having to fight a more costly war later. There are, however, apparent weaknesses in the concept of preventive war in explaining Japanese leaders way of thinking on the eve of the Pacific War. This book proposes a revised version of the concept of preventive war that better explains the Japanese decision. According to this concept, war is undertaken by a country incapable of adapting domestically to a systemic changing power differential. Lacking the capacity to increase sufficiently its national power or to undergo the necessary domestic transformations in order to adjust to the evolving constraints imposed by the systemic environment, the country undertakes preventive war as a means to directly affect the power differential. The analysis sheds light on the underdeveloped concept of preventive war, and provides a fresh look on the causes of the Pacific War. 184 pp. Englisch.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Why did Japanese policy makers decide to attack the United States while aware of their very limited chance of success in war Historical facts indicate that the Japanese decision could be explained by the theoretical concept of preventive war: Japan decided to go to war in December 1941 in order to avoid having to fight a more costly war later. There are, however, apparent weaknesses in the concept of preventive war in explaining Japanese leaders way of thinking on the eve of the Pacific War. This book proposes a revised version of the concept of preventive war that better explains the Japanese decision. According to this concept, war is undertaken by a country incapable of adapting domestically to a systemic changing power differential. Lacking the capacity to increase sufficiently its national power or to undergo the necessary domestic transformations in order to adjust to the evolving constraints imposed by the systemic environment, the country undertakes preventive war as a means to directly affect the power differential. The analysis sheds light on the underdeveloped concept of preventive war, and provides a fresh look on the causes of the Pacific War.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 184 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 184.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Fatton LionelLionel Fatton holds two Master s Degrees in International Relations, from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies of Geneva and from the Waseda University of Tokyo. He is currently Ph.D. candidate.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Why did Japanese policy makers decide to attack the United States while aware of their very limited chance of success in war Historical facts indicate that the Japanese decision could be explained by the theoretical concept of preventive war: Japan decided to go to war in December 1941 in order to avoid having to fight a more costly war later. There are, however, apparent weaknesses in the concept of preventive war in explaining Japanese leaders' way of thinking on the eve of the Pacific War. This book proposes a revised version of the concept of preventive war that better explains the Japanese decision. According to this concept, war is undertaken by a country incapable of adapting domestically to a systemic changing power differential. Lacking the capacity to increase sufficiently its national power or to undergo the necessary domestic transformations in order to adjust to the evolving constraints imposed by the systemic environment, the country undertakes preventive war as a means to directly affect the power differential. The analysis sheds light on the underdeveloped concept of preventive war, and provides a fresh look on the causes of the Pacific War.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 184 pp. Englisch.…

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.