Constructing practical reasons de müller andreas (19 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: New. Estado de la sobrecubierta: New. First Edition. Dark blue hardback with gilt lettered spine, complete with original dustjacket. In new condition: firm and square with strong joints, no bumps, no rubs. Contents are crisp, tight and clean; no pen-marks. Thus a very nice copy that looks and feels unread, now offered for sale at a very reasonable price.…

Condición: New.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: new.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 241 pages. 8.75x5.50x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in the slogan that reasonsare not discovered but made by us. Andreas Mueller elaborates this idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, makes its theoretical commitments explicit, and defends it against somewell-known objections.Constructing Practical Reasons begins with an examination of the distinctive role that reason judgements play in the process of practical reasoning. This provides the resources for an anti-representationalist conception of the nature of those judgements, according to which they are true, if they are true, not because they accurately represent certain normative facts, but because of their role in sound reasoning. On the resulting view, aconsideration owes its status as a reason to the truth of the corresponding reason judgement and thus, ultimately, to the soundness of a certain episode of reasoning. Consequently, our practical reasons exhibit akind of mind-dependence, but this does not force us to deny their objectivity. Our actions are informed by the consideration of reasons; reasons which constructivism suggests are not simply discovered, but made by us. This book examines this view, elaborating its basic idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, making its theoretical commitments explicit, and defending it against well-known objections. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New.

Hardback. Condición: New. Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in the slogan that reasons are not discovered but made by us. Andreas Müller elaborates this idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, makes its theoretical commitments explicit, and defends it against some well-known objections. Constructing Practical Reasons begins with an examination of the distinctive role that reason judgements play in the process of practical reasoning. This provides the resources for an anti-representationalist conception of the nature of those judgements, according to which they are true, if they are true, not because they accurately represent certain normative facts, but because of their role in sound reasoning. On the resulting view, a consideration owes its status as a reason to the truth of the corresponding reason judgement and thus, ultimately, to the soundness of a certain episode of reasoning. Consequently, our practical reasons exhibit a kind of mind-dependence, but this does not force us to deny their objectivity.…

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 241 pages. 8.75x5.50x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Condición: New.

Hardback. Condición: New. Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in the slogan that reasons are not discovered but made by us. Andreas Müller elaborates this idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, makes its theoretical commitments explicit, and defends it against some well-known objections. Constructing Practical Reasons begins with an examination of the distinctive role that reason judgements play in the process of practical reasoning. This provides the resources for an anti-representationalist conception of the nature of those judgements, according to which they are true, if they are true, not because they accurately represent certain normative facts, but because of their role in sound reasoning. On the resulting view, a consideration owes its status as a reason to the truth of the corresponding reason judgement and thus, ultimately, to the soundness of a certain episode of reasoning. Consequently, our practical reasons exhibit a kind of mind-dependence, but this does not force us to deny their objectivity.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Some things are reasons for us to perform certain actions. That it will spare you great pain in the future, for example, is a reason for you to go to the dentist now, and that you are already late for work is a reason for you not to read the next article in the morning paper. Why are such considerations reasons for or against certain actions? Constructivism offers an intriguing answer to this question. Its basic idea is often encapsulated in the slogan that reasonsare not discovered but made by us. Andreas Mueller elaborates this idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, makes its theoretical commitments explicit, and defends it against somewell-known objections.Constructing Practical Reasons begins with an examination of the distinctive role that reason judgements play in the process of practical reasoning. This provides the resources for an anti-representationalist conception of the nature of those judgements, according to which they are true, if they are true, not because they accurately represent certain normative facts, but because of their role in sound reasoning. On the resulting view, aconsideration owes its status as a reason to the truth of the corresponding reason judgement and thus, ultimately, to the soundness of a certain episode of reasoning. Consequently, our practical reasons exhibit akind of mind-dependence, but this does not force us to deny their objectivity. Our actions are informed by the consideration of reasons; reasons which constructivism suggests are not simply discovered, but made by us. This book examines this view, elaborating its basic idea into a fully-fledged account of practical reasons, making its theoretical commitments explicit, and defending it against well-known objections. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.