9789819969203 - Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing: A Game-theoretic Approach (SpringerBriefs in Computer Science) de Li, Youqi; Li, Fan; Yang, Song; Zhang, Chuan (16 resultados)

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people's daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users' participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users' costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing.This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions.This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing | A Game-theoretic Approach | Youqi Li (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | xi | Englisch | 2024 | Springer | EAN 9789819969203 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Condición: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people¿s daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users¿ participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users¿ costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing.This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions.This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT.

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people's daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users' participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users' costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing.This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions.This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT. 144 pp. Englisch.

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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Clarifying the equilibrium analysis for incentive mechanism in mobile crowdsensingProviding game-theoretic solutions for designing incentive mechanism in more practical mobile crowdsensingUnderstanding the importance and design principle of.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people¿s daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users¿ participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users¿ costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing.This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive mechanism, and a coopetition-aware incentive mechanism for MCS, respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes this book and point out the future directions.This book is of particular interest to the readers and researchers in the field of IoT research, especially in the interdisciplinary field of network economics and IoT.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 144 pp. Englisch.