9789048172801 - Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution: 104 (Philosophical Studies Series) de Boër, Steven E. (11 resultados)

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Thought-Contents | On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution | Steven E. Boër | Taschenbuch | Philosophical Studies Series | xviii | Englisch | 2010 | Springer | EAN 9789048172801 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - According to our commonsense view of the matter, beliefs, desires, intentions and the like are special kinds of internal states the possession of which by a given cr- ture potentially explains its behavior and otherwise renders the creature intelligible to us. So-called folk psychology provides us with a rough-and-ready network of counterfactuals delimiting the role supposedly played by these internal states v- à-vis perceptual input, inference, and behavioral output in a normal member of our species. The exact empirical details of this network do not matter here, for we are not undertaking further re nement or systematization of the relevant counterfac- als. Instead, our topic is the ontological analysis of the internal states that occupy the nodes of this complex network and the bearing of that analysis on the truth conditions of the sentences we use to ascribe beliefs and related states. The relevant counterfactuals canonically describe particular belief-, desire-, and intention-states as states of believing, desiring, and intending that such-a- such. The use of in nitival clauses to describe desires and intentions is not really an exception, for desiring or intending to do A (or to be F) is just having a self-regarding desire or intention that oneself does A (or that oneself is F). By the lights of our commonsense psychology, then, to be in a particular belief-, desire-, or intention-state is to bear the corresponding attitudinal relation- believing, desiring, or intending-to a certain content.

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book provides a formal ontology of senses and the belief-relation that grounds the distinction between de dicto, de re, and de se beliefs as well as the opacity of belief reports. According to this ontology, the relata of the belief-relation are an agent and a special sort of object-dependent sense (a 'thought-content'), the latter being an 'abstract' property encoding various syntactic and semantic constraints on sentences of a language of thought. 400 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -According to our commonsense view of the matter, beliefs, desires, intentions and the like are special kinds of internal states the possession of which by a given cr- ture potentially explains its behavior and otherwise renders the creature intelligible to us. So-called folk psychology provides us with a rough-and-ready network of counterfactuals delimiting the role supposedly played by these internal states v- à-vis perceptual input, inference, and behavioral output in a normal member of our species. The exact empirical details of this network do not matter here, for we are not undertaking further re nement or systematization of the relevant counterfac- als. Instead, our topic is the ontological analysis of the internal states that occupy the nodes of this complex network and the bearing of that analysis on the truth conditions of the sentences we use to ascribe beliefs and related states. The relevant counterfactuals canonically describe particular belief-, desire-, and intention-states as states of believing, desiring, and intending that such-a- such. The use of in nitival clauses to describe desires and intentions is not really an exception, for desiring or intending to do A (or to be F) is just having a self-regarding desire or intention that oneself does A (or that oneself is F). By the lights of our commonsense psychology, then, to be in a particular belief-, desire-, or intention-state is to bear the corresponding attitudinal relation¿ believing, desiring, or intending¿to a certain content.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 400 pp. Englisch.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 400 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 400.