Isbn: 9788132235026 - economic analysis of liability rules (20 resultados)

Condición: New.

Paperback or Softback. Condición: New. Economic Analysis of Liability Rules. Book.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. In.

PF. Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. pp. 192 Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2015 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. reprint edition. 192 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.44 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Economic Analysis of Liability Rules | Satish Kumar Jain | Taschenbuch | ix | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9788132235026 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.…

Condición: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.…

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condición: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency. The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled. 192 pp. Englisch.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 192.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 192.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Presents a comprehensive analysis of liability rulesContains complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rulesEstablishes that the untaken precaution approach as well as decoupled liability ar.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 192 pp. Englisch.…