9783843304047 - Provably secure constructions in cryptography: Weak definitions of security and cryptographic constructions that can be proven secure under these definitions de Nik... (9 resultados)

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Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 112 pages. 8.66x5.91x0.26 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Provably secure constructions in cryptography | Weak definitions of security and cryptographic constructions that can be proven secure under these definitions | Sergey Nikolenko | Taschenbuch | 112 S. | Englisch | 2013 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783843304047 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: BoD - Books on Demand, In de Tarpen 42, 22848 Norderstedt, info[at]bod[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -At present, little can be proven under the definitions of modern cryptography. To prove that a cryptosystem is secure, one would first have to prove that P does not equal NP. This book is devoted to cryptographic constructions that can be proven secure in a weaker sense. We cover three topics in the book. Complete one-way functions are one-way if there are any one-way functions at all. Feebly secure cryptographic primitives can be proven secure in the strongest classical model of computation, namely general circuit complexity, but security guarantees are only constant. Finally, algebraic cryptography provides examples of noncommutative constructions that are secure against provable break, i.e., against an adversary who can present encoding examples for the messages he deciphers. 112 pp. Englisch.

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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Nikolenko SergeyDr. Sergey Nikolenko is currently a researcher at the Steklov Mathematical Institute in St. Petersburg, Russia. His interests lie primarily in computer science, including cryptography, theoretical CS, and Bayesian .

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -At present, little can be proven under the definitions of modern cryptography. To prove that a cryptosystem is secure, one would first have to prove that P does not equal NP. This book is devoted to cryptographic constructions that can be proven secure in a weaker sense. We cover three topics in the book. Complete one-way functions are one-way if there are any one-way functions at all. Feebly secure cryptographic primitives can be proven secure in the strongest classical model of computation, namely general circuit complexity, but security guarantees are only constant. Finally, algebraic cryptography provides examples of noncommutative constructions that are secure against provable break, i.e., against an adversary who can present encoding examples for the messages he deciphers.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 112 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - At present, little can be proven under the definitions of modern cryptography. To prove that a cryptosystem is secure, one would first have to prove that P does not equal NP. This book is devoted to cryptographic constructions that can be proven secure in a weaker sense. We cover three topics in the book. Complete one-way functions are one-way if there are any one-way functions at all. Feebly secure cryptographic primitives can be proven secure in the strongest classical model of computation, namely general circuit complexity, but security guarantees are only constant. Finally, algebraic cryptography provides examples of noncommutative constructions that are secure against provable break, i.e., against an adversary who can present encoding examples for the messages he deciphers.