9783790813074 - financial intermediation and deregulation: a critical analysis of japanese bank-firm relationships (contributions to economics) de miarka, tobias (11 resultados)
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The author develops a model of bank-firm relationships on the basis of the following general idea: Banks want to prevent moral hazard on the side of their customers. In particular they want to prevent their business customers to use… bank credit for purposes different from those that have been negotiated thus damaging the bank's interest. The idea of this model is relatively simple. Banks do not extend a loan if the project for which the money is intended will probably be un profitable. They extend the loan if the success of the project is highly probable and if the revenues from that project are greater than the expenses of the bank for monitoring the customer. Assuming as Miarka does that the results from a successful project are certain, this model is an equivalent to minimizing moni toring costs. In fact, this is the outcome of the model. The banks are known to monitor their loans. They thereby signal to the capital market that they have tested the project. Therefore, the buyer of bonds of the company on the capital market may rest assured that the project is financially sound. The buyers of bonds thus avoid monitoring costs and can grant better credit conditions than the banks. Pur chasers of bor. . ds are free riders on the monitoring of the banks. Miarka tests his model econometrically. The results are amazingly supportive of the model. 150 pp. Englisch.
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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 168 2 Figures, 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.
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Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 168.
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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The author develops a model of bank-firm relationships on the basis of the following general idea: Banks want to prevent moral hazard on the side of their customers. In particular they want to prevent their business c…ustomers to use bank credit for purposes.
Idioma: Inglés
Editorial: Physica Jul 2000, 2000
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Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemaniabuchversandmimpf2000
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -The author develops a model of bank-firm relationships on the basis of the following general idea: Banks want to prevent moral hazard on the side of their customers. In particular they want to prevent their business customers to use ban…k credit for purposes different from those that have been negotiated thus damaging the bank's interest. The idea of this model is relatively simple. Banks do not extend a loan if the project for which the money is intended will probably be un profitable. They extend the loan if the success of the project is highly probable and if the revenues from that project are greater than the expenses of the bank for monitoring the customer. Assuming as Miarka does that the results from a successful project are certain, this model is an equivalent to minimizing moni toring costs. In fact, this is the outcome of the model. The banks are known to monitor their loans. They thereby signal to the capital market that they have tested the project. Therefore, the buyer of bonds of the company on the capital market may rest assured that the project is financially sound. The buyers of bonds thus avoid monitoring costs and can grant better credit conditions than the banks. Pur chasers of bor. . ds are free riders on the monitoring of the banks. Miarka tests his model econometrically. The results are amazingly supportive of the model.Physica Verlag, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 168 pp. Englisch.
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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - The author develops a model of bank-firm relationships on the basis of the following general idea: Banks want to prevent moral hazard on the side of their customers. In particular they want to prevent their business customers to use bank… credit for purposes different from those that have been negotiated thus damaging the bank's interest. The idea of this model is relatively simple. Banks do not extend a loan if the project for which the money is intended will probably be un profitable. They extend the loan if the success of the project is highly probable and if the revenues from that project are greater than the expenses of the bank for monitoring the customer. Assuming as Miarka does that the results from a successful project are certain, this model is an equivalent to minimizing moni toring costs. In fact, this is the outcome of the model. The banks are known to monitor their loans. They thereby signal to the capital market that they have tested the project. Therefore, the buyer of bonds of the company on the capital market may rest assured that the project is financially sound. The buyers of bonds thus avoid monitoring costs and can grant better credit conditions than the banks. Pur chasers of bor. . ds are free riders on the monitoring of the banks. Miarka tests his model econometrically. The results are amazingly supportive of the model.
