ISBN: 9783642197628 - cooperation and efficiency in markets: 649 (lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems) (17 resultados)

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Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 2011 edition. 99 pages. 9.25x6.00x0.25 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets | Milan Hornia¿ek | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | vii | Englisch | 2011 | Springer | EAN 9783642197628 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.…

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare. 100 pp. Englisch.…

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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The unified analysis of existence and efficiency properties of equilibria provides justification for economic policy reformsThe analysis of cooperative managerial capitalism is interesting for economic historiansThe analysis of inter-firm c.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 100 pp. Englisch.…