Librería: Zubal-Books, Since 1961, Cleveland, OH, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 31,83
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: Fine. 140 pp., Paperback, fine. - If you are reading this, this item is actually (physically) in our stock and ready for shipment once ordered. We are not bookjackers. Buyer is responsible for any additional duties, taxes, or fees required by recipient's country.
Idioma: Alemán
Publicado por Berlin ; Heidelberg ; New York ; London ; Paris ; Tokyo ; Hong Kong ; Barcelona ; Budapest : Springer, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540543724 ISBN 13: 9783540543725
Librería: NEPO UG, Rüsselsheim am Main, Alemania
EUR 3,99
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carrito(Berlin. Condición: Gut. 139 S. ; 24 cm Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 550 Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1991.
Idioma: Alemán
Publicado por Berlin , Heidelberg , New York , London , Paris , Tokyo , Hong Kong , Barcelona , Budapest : Springer, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540543724 ISBN 13: 9783540543725
Librería: NEPO UG, Rüsselsheim am Main, Alemania
EUR 3,99
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritokart. Condición: Gut. 139 S. , 24 cm Versand am folgenden Arbeitstag mit Rechnung daily shipping worldwide with invoice ex library Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
EUR 60,42
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. In.
EUR 56,63
Cantidad disponible: 10 disponibles
Añadir al carritoPF. Condición: New.
Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 75,68
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. pp. v + 140 Softcover Reprint of the Original 1st Edition 1991.
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
EUR 76,29
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoPaperback. Condición: Brand New. 140 pages. 9.53x6.69x0.35 inches. In Stock.
EUR 53,49
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T 1 and the penalty v 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory.
EUR 50,25
Cantidad disponible: 5 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Balanced Silverman Games on General Discrete Sets | Gerald A. Heuer (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | v | Englisch | 1991 | Springer | EAN 9783540543725 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
EUR 75,51
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Print on Demand pp. v + 140 26 Figures.
Librería: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Alemania
EUR 76,56
Cantidad disponible: 4 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. v + 140.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540543724 ISBN 13: 9783540543725
Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
EUR 48,37
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T > 1 and the penalty v > 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The h.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer, J.B. Metzler Sep 1991, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540543724 ISBN 13: 9783540543725
Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemania
EUR 53,49
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Games are studied in which within certain bounds the player with the larger number wins, but loses if it is too much larger than the other. The games model various bidding or spending situations governed by rules of this nature. Under quite general conditions the games reduce to finite matrix games.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 152 pp. Englisch.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg Sep 1991, 1991
ISBN 10: 3540543724 ISBN 13: 9783540543725
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
EUR 96,29
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -A Silverman game is a two-person zero-sum game defined in terms of two sets S I and S II of positive numbers, and two parameters, the threshold T 1 and the penalty v 0. Players I and II independently choose numbers from S I and S II, respectively. The higher number wins 1, unless it is at least T times as large as the other, in which case it loses v. Equal numbers tie. Such a game might be used to model various bidding or spending situations in which within some bounds the higher bidder or bigger spender wins, but loses if it is overdone. Such situations may include spending on armaments, advertising spending or sealed bids in an auction. Previous work has dealt mainly with special cases. In this work recent progress for arbitrary discrete sets S I and S II is presented. Under quite general conditions, these games reduce to finite matrix games. A large class of games are completely determined by the diagonal of the matrix, and it is shown how the great majority of these appear to have unique optimal strategies. The work is accessible to all who are familiar with basic noncooperative game theory. 152 pp. Englisch.