Isbn: 9783319961293 - the science of quantitative information flow (information security and cryptography) (17 resultados)

Condición: Brand New. New. US edition. Expediting shipping for all USA and Europe orders excluding PO Box. Excellent Customer Service.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively - so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated - and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable.Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., 'leaks', can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios.The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.…

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 508 pages. 9.25x6.10x1.34 inches. In Stock.

Condición: Hervorragend. Zustand: Hervorragend | Seiten: 508 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively ¿ so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated ¿ and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable.Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., "leaks", can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios.The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.…

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively - so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated - and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable.Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., 'leaks', can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios.The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook. 508 pp. Englisch.…

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Computer systems that process sensitive information should preserve that information s confidentiality, but our current cyber-infrastructure is failing to achieve this goal: reports of massive-scale information disclosures are distressingly frequentWritt. …

Condición: New. Print on Demand.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book presents a comprehensive mathematical theory that explains precisely what information flow is, how it can be assessed quantitatively ¿ so bringing precise meaning to the intuition that certain information leaks are small enough to be tolerated ¿ and how systems can be constructed that achieve rigorous, quantitative information-flow guarantees in those terms. It addresses the fundamental challenge that functional and practical requirements frequently conflict with the goal of preserving confidentiality, making perfect security unattainable.Topics include: a systematic presentation of how unwanted information flow, i.e., 'leaks', can be quantified in operationally significant ways and then bounded, both with respect to estimated benefit for an attacking adversary and by comparisons between alternative implementations; a detailed study of capacity, refinement, and Dalenius leakage, supporting robust leakage assessments; a unification of information-theoretic channels and information-leaking sequential programs within the same framework; and a collection of case studies, showing how the theory can be applied to interesting realistic scenarios.The text is unified, self-contained and comprehensive, accessible to students and researchers with some knowledge of discrete probability and undergraduate mathematics, and contains exercises to facilitate its use as a course textbook.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 508 pp. Englisch.…