Isbn: 9781849048132 - high command: british military leadership in the iraq and afghanistan wars (conflict classics) (19 resultados)

Condición: Good. 44. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Paperback. Condición: Very Good. ** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot ReportEarly Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.…

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. ** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot Report-Early Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Why didn't the British Military high command achieve much better results in 2000-10 in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what accounts for this poor performance? Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condición: New. ** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot Report-Early Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated.In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable.…

Paperback. Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 320 pages. 8.43x5.55x0.91 inches. In Stock.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. Reveals how the MOD focused on making plans work rather than questioning whether such goals made military sense Series: Conflict Classics. Num Pages: 320 pages. BIC Classification: 1DBK; 1FBQ; 1FCA; HBWS4; HBWS5; JPV; JWL. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Weight in Grams: 400. . 2017. Paperback. . . . . …

paperback. Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. Reveals how the MOD focused on making plans work rather than questioning whether such goals made military sense Series: Conflict Classics. Num Pages: 320 pages. BIC Classification: 1DBK; 1FBQ; 1FCA; HBWS4; HBWS5; JPV; JWL. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Weight in Grams: 400. . 2017. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Condición: New.

Paperback / softback. Condición: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Why didn't the British Military high command achieve much better results in 2000-10 in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what accounts for this poor performance.

Condición: fine. l'article peut presenter de tres legers signes d'usure. vendeur professionnel; envoi soigne en 24/48h.

Condición: New. Why didn t the British Military high command achieve much better results in 2000-10 in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what accounts for this poor performance?KlappentextrnrnWhy didn t the British Military high command achieve much better results .

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. ** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot Report-Early Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Why didn't the British Military high command achieve much better results in 2000-10 in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what accounts for this poor performance? Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condición: New. ** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot Report-Early Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated.In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable.…