9780815777618 - The Public Use of Private Interest: 1976 (Key Concepts in Philosophy) de Schultze, Charles L. (28 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Good.

Condición: acceptable. The book is complete and readable, with all pages and cover intact. Dust jacket, shrink wrap, or boxed set case may be missing. Pages may have light notes, highlighting, or minor water exposure, but nothing that affects readability. May be an ex-library copy and could include library markings or stickers.

Condición: Very Good. Item in very good condition! Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.

Condición: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Condición: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Condición: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.

Condición: Good. Good condition. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains. Bundled media such as CDs, DVDs, floppy disks or access codes may not be included.

paperback. Condición: Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

Paperback. Condición: Good. Highlighting to text; binding tight; moderate wear to covers. 93 pages. Size: 5 1/2" x 8 1/2".

Trade paperback. Condición: Fine. Revised ed. Trade paperback (US). Glued binding. 93 p. Contains: Illustrations, black & white. Miscellany of History No. 5, 1976. Audience: General/trade. No previous owner's name. Clean, tight pages. No bent corners. SC 276.

Trade Paperback. Condición: Very Good. Susan Foster (Cover Design) Ilustrador. 93 pp. Nearly flawless copy with moderate wear to cover pages. Clean text. Bright, crisp pages.

Paperback. Condición: Very Good. Prompt Shipment, shipped in Boxes, Tracking PROVIDEDUsed sticked spine, name inked out ffep, else very good.

Condición: Very Good.

Soft cover. Condición: Very Good. 1st Edition. Brookings Institution Press. Paperback.1977 First edition 93 pages, some shelf rubbing to covers Otherwise inside in VERY GOOD CLEAN TIGHT READING ORDER. Full refund if not satisfied. 24 hour despatch. If not pictured in this listing, a scan of the actual book is available on request.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. revised edition. 108 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Couverture souple. Condición: Satisfaisant.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. According to conventional wisdom, government may intervene when private markets fail to provide goods and services that society values. This view has led to the passage of much legislation and the creation of a host of agencies that have attempted, by exquisitely detailed regulations, to compel legislatively defined behavior in a broad range of activities affecting society as a wholehealth care, housing, pollution abatement, transportation, to name only a few. Far from achieving the goals of the legislators and regulators, these efforts have been largely ineffective; worse, they have spawned endless litigation and countless administrative proceedings as the individuals and firms on who the regulations fall seek to avoid, or at least soften, their impact. The result has been long delays in determining whether government programs work at all, thwarting of agreed-upon societal aims, and deep skepticism about the power of government to make any difference. Strangely enough in a nation that since its inception has valued both the means and the ends of the private market system, the United States has rarely tried to harness private interests to public goals. Whenever private markets fail to produce some desired good or service (or fail to deter undesirable activity), the remedies proposed have hardly ever involved creating a system of incentives similar to those of the market place so as to make private choice consonant with public virtue. In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox. He outlines a plan for government intervention that would turn away from the direct ""command and control"" regulating techniques of the past and rely instead on market-like incentives to encourage people indirectly to take publicly desired actions. "Hess brings not only first-rate credentials, but a cool, dispassionate perspective, an incisive analytical approach, and a willingness to stick his neck out in making judgments." - American Political Science Review This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. According to conventional wisdom, government may intervene when private markets fail to provide goods and services that society values. This view has led to the passage of much legislation and the creation of a host of agencies that have attempted, by exquisitely detailed regulations, to compel legislatively defined behavior in a broad range of activities affecting society as a wholehealth care, housing, pollution abatement, transportation, to name only a few. Far from achieving the goals of the legislators and regulators, these efforts have been largely ineffective; worse, they have spawned endless litigation and countless administrative proceedings as the individuals and firms on who the regulations fall seek to avoid, or at least soften, their impact. The result has been long delays in determining whether government programs work at all, thwarting of agreed-upon societal aims, and deep skepticism about the power of government to make any difference. Strangely enough in a nation that since its inception has valued both the means and the ends of the private market system, the United States has rarely tried to harness private interests to public goals. Whenever private markets fail to produce some desired good or service (or fail to deter undesirable activity), the remedies proposed have hardly ever involved creating a system of incentives similar to those of the market place so as to make private choice consonant with public virtue. In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox. He outlines a plan for government intervention that would turn away from the direct ""command and control"" regulating techniques of the past and rely instead on market-like incentives to encourage people indirectly to take publicly desired actions. "Hess brings not only first-rate credentials, but a cool, dispassionate perspective, an incisive analytical approach, and a willingness to stick his neck out in making judgments." - American Political Science Review This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. &Uumlber den Autor Charles L. Schultze is a senior fellow in the Economic Studies program at Brookings. He was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during the Carter administration and director of the U.S. Bureau of the B.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - 'According to conventional wisdom, government may intervene when private markets fail to provide goods and services that society values. This view has led to the passage of much legislation and the creation of a host of agencies that have attempted, by exquisitely detailed regulations, to compel legislatively defined behavior in a broad range of activities affecting society as a whole-health care, housing, pollution abatement, transportation, to name only a few. Far from achieving the goals of the legislators and regulators, these efforts have been largely ineffective; worse, they have spawned endless litigation and countless administrative proceedings as the individuals and firms on who the regulations fall seek to avoid, or at least soften, their impact. The result has been long delays in determining whether government programs work at all, thwarting of agreed-upon societal aims, and deep skepticism about the power of government to make any difference. Strangely enough in a nation that since its inception has valued both the means and the ends of the private market system, the United States has rarely tried to harness private interests to public goals. Whenever private markets fail to produce some desired good or service (or fail to deter undesirable activity), the remedies proposed have hardly ever involved creating a system of incentives similar to those of the market place so as to make private choice consonant with public virtue. In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox. He outlines a plan for government intervention that would turn away from the direct ''command and control'' regulating techniques of the past and rely instead on market-like incentives to encourage people indirectly to take publicly desired actions.'.