9780815709817 - strategic command and control: redefining the nuclear threat de blair, bruce (18 resultados)
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Librería: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaWorld of Books (was SecondSale)
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EUR 6,15
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Condición: Very Good. Item in very good condition! Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
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Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de AmericaThriftBooks-Dallas
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EUR 6,74
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Paperback. Condición: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
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Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de AmericaThriftBooks-Dallas
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EUR 6,74
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Paperback. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
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Librería: R&R Better Books, Martinez, CA, Estados Unidos de AmericaR&R Better Books
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Paperback. Condición: Near Fine. * Book cover like new - pages clean, bright and unmarked spine like new. * Proceeds benefit Friends of the Library; books sold are NOT ex-library. * "Honest and reliable service - every book hand-packaged with care.".
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Librería: WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Reino UnidoWorldofBooks
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EUR 23,28
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Paperback. Condición: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.
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Librería: California Books, Miami, FL, Estados Unidos de AmericaCalifornia Books
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EUR 32,81
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Condición: New.
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- Primera edición
Librería: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGround Zero Books, Ltd.
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EUR 28,83
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Trade paperback. Condición: Very good. xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Wo…odrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board, a group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated].
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- Primera edición
Librería: Palimpsest Scholarly Books & Services, Brooktondale, NY, Estados Unidos de AmericaPalimpsest Scholarly Books & Services
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EUR 31,04
Envío por EUR 5,60Se envía dentro de Estados Unidos de AmericaCantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Soft cover. Condición: Fine. 1st Edition. Second printing. Softcover volume, measuring approximately 6.25" x 9.25", displays very light shelfwear. Binding is firm. Interior is clean and bright. Illustrated with tables, graphs and maps. xiv/341 pages. "During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding…nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U. S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communication not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike.".
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Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino UnidoRia Christie Collections
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EUR 31,43
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Condición: New. In.
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Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino UnidoRevaluation Books
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EUR 43,24
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Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 356 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.
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Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de AmericaBooks Puddle
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EUR 58,04
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Condición: New. pp. 341.
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Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino UnidoMajestic Books
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EUR 54,93
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Condición: New. pp. 341.
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Librería: BennettBooksLtd, Los Angeles, CA, Estados Unidos de AmericaBennettBooksLtd
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EUR 75,15
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paperback. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title.
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Librería: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaGrand Eagle Retail
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EUR 32,81
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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political l…eaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
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Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino UnidoPBShop.store UK
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EUR 31,53
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PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
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Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino UnidoCitiRetail
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EUR 35,34
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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political l…eaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
Contactar con el vendedorVendedor de 5 estrellasCondición: Nuevo
EUR 48,17
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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptab…le damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.
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Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemaniamoluna
Contactar con el vendedorVendedor de 5 estrellasCondición: Nuevo
EUR 30,34
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Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextDuring the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a sur…prise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict.
