Isbn: 9780521842693 - hamilton's paradox hardback: the promise and peril of fiscal federalism (cambridge studies in comparative politics) (16 resultados)

Broschiert. Condición: Gut. 313 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 465.

Condición: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Condición: Very Good. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Book contains pen underlining. Hardcover in great shape, binding tight.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. This book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 334 pages, 22 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; KFFD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 22. Weight in Grams: 660. . 2006. hardcover. . . . . …

Condición: New. This book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 334 pages, 22 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; KFFD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 22. Weight in Grams: 660. . 2006. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Hardcover. Condición: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 334 9:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 334.

Hardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 334.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic explanation of why decentralized countries have had dramatically different fiscal experiences. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and contemporary case studies, this book lays out the first systematic .…