Isbn: 9780521532662 - democracy and the rule of law: 5 (cambridge studies in the theory of democracy, series number 5) (29 resultados)

Condición: Fair. The item is fairly worn but still readable. The book may have some cosmetic wear like creased spine, cover, scratches, curled corners, folded pages, sunburn, stains, water damage, bent, torn, damaged binding, dent. The dust jacket if present, may be marked, and have considerable heavy wear. The book might be ex-library copy, and may have the markings and stickers associated from the library - The book may have considerable highlights, notes, underlined pages but the text is legible.…

Condición: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Condición: Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions.…

Paperback. Condición: Good+, sound copy. Paperback. 321pp. Reprint. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Stamped damaged to title page but no obvious damage. Very clean and of unread appearance. Good+, sound copy.

Condición: As New. This copy is in Like New condition ? crisp, clean, and showing no meaningful signs of use. Pages are bright and free from any marks, writing, or highlighting. The spine is tight and the covers are sharp with no creasing or damage. Every book we list is individually hand-checked by our team at Kisharon Langdon New Chapters. We take pride in honest, accurate grading ? what you read is what you receive. New Chapters is a social enterprise supporting people with Learning Disabilities and Autistic People into meaningful work. Your purchase makes a real difference.…

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.…

Condición: New. pp. 334 Indices.

Paperback. Condición: New.

Softcover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. xi, 321 p.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. Addresses why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. Editor(s): Maravall, Jose Maria; Przeworski, Adam. Series: Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Num Pages: 334 pages, 1 b/w illus. 1 table. BIC Classification: JPA; JPHV; LAM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 228 x 152 x 20. Weight in Grams: 438. . 2003. paperback. . . . . …

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. Addresses why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. Editor(s): Maravall, Jose Maria; Przeworski, Adam. Series: Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Num Pages: 334 pages, 1 b/w illus. 1 table. BIC Classification: JPA; JPHV; LAM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 228 x 152 x 20. Weight in Grams: 438. . 2003. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Condición: New. Brand New! Fast Delivery This is an International Edition and ship within 24-48 hours. Deliver by FedEx and Dhl, & Aramex, UPS, & USPS and we do accept APO and PO BOX Addresses. Order can be delivered worldwide within 6-10 days and we do have flat rate for up to 2LB. Extra shipping charges will be requested if the Book weight is more than 5 LB. This Item May be shipped from India, United states & United Kingdom. Depending on your location and availability.…

paperback. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.…

Paperback. Condición: New. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. It interprets the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 334 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 334 Acknowledgements.

Paperback / softback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. It interprets the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. It interprets the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politician.…

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest. This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. It interprets the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Democracy and the Rule of Law | Adam Przeworski (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2010 | Cambridge University Press | EAN 9780521532662 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…