ISBN: 9780521039536 - brute rationality: normativity and human action (cambridge studies in philosophy) (12 resultados)

paperback. Condición: Fine. 1st Edition. Grade 4 out of 5 points. This is a used book. Book may have wear due to handling. Has no markings on pages. May not include extra materials like access codes, CDs, accessories, etc. All orders ship by next business day! We are a small company and very thankful for your business.…

Condición: New.

Condición: New. This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Num Pages: 248 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPCF5; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 216 x 138 x 14. Weight in Grams: 320. . 2008. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . …

Condición: New. pp. 248.

Condición: New. This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Num Pages: 248 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: HPCF5; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 216 x 138 x 14. Weight in Grams: 320. . 2008. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.…

PF. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is 6-7 days from our warehouse. Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely.

Paperback / softback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 248 1:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 248.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally. In this book, Joshua Gert argues that rather than simply 'counting in favour of' action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. His book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular and moral theory more generally. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. In this book, Joshua Gert argues that rather than simply counting in favour of action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. His book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason i.…