9780521022798 - Information Incentives Econ Control de Archibald, G. C. (14 resultados)

Condición: New.

Condición: New. In.

Paperback. Condición: New.

Condición: New. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning. Num Pages: 192 pages, 6 b/w illus. 1 table. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 216 x 138 x 11. Weight in Grams: 250. . 2008. Illustrated. paperback. . . . .

Condición: New. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning. Num Pages: 192 pages, 6 b/w illus. 1 table. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 216 x 138 x 11. Weight in Grams: 250. . 2008. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 173 pages. 8.25x5.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 192 Illus.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 192.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 192.

Paperback / softback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. The author considers methods involving feedback iterative controls which require the prior selection of a 'criterion function', but no prior calculation of optimal quantities. The target is adjusted as the results for each step become data for the criterion function. Implementation is built in by the incentive structure, and all controls rely on consistency with the self-interest of individuals. The applicability of all the methods is shown to be independent of the form of ownership of enterprises: examples are given for industries which are wholly privately owned, wholly nationalized, mixed and labour-managed. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently perfect .