Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Gulf Coast Books, Cypress, TX, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 5,38
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Añadir al carritohardcover. Condición: Fair.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: World of Books (was SecondSale), Montgomery, IL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 5,39
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Añadir al carritoCondición: Good. Item in good condition. Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: ThriftBooks-Dallas, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 6,06
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Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 17,11
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press 7/22/2014, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 19,49
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Añadir al carritoHardback or Cased Book. Condición: New. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem. Book.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 18,09
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Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, US, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 21,06
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Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 17,54
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: California Books, Miami, FL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 21,61
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, US, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Reino Unido
EUR 25,32
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Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlanda
EUR 23,87
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Series: Kenneth J. Arrow Lectures Series. Num Pages: 168 pages. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 149 x 211 x 17. Weight in Grams: 328. . 2014. Hardcover. . . . .
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Books Puddle, New York, NY, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 32,21
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. pp. 160.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 28,55
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Series: Kenneth J. Arrow Lectures Series. Num Pages: 168 pages. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 149 x 211 x 17. Weight in Grams: 328. . 2014. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
EUR 26,56
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Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Brand New. 160 pages. 8.50x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 22,60
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 24,62
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Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, US, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 22,67
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Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
EUR 23,59
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Kenneth J. Arrow s impossibility theorem was a watershed in welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice. This book explores the implications of Arrow s theorem. Amartya Sen considers its value and limitations in relation to social reasoning, a.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press Jul 2014, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
EUR 27,85
Cantidad disponible: 2 disponibles
Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking impossibility theorem was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of Arrows theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorems value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal - given that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, US, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Reino Unido
EUR 22,61
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Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
EUR 24,19
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: New. pp. 160 This item is printed on demand.
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
EUR 25,93
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Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Brand New. 160 pages. 8.50x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Columbia University Press, 2014
ISBN 10: 0231153287 ISBN 13: 9780231153287
Librería: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Reino Unido
EUR 25,84
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Añadir al carritoHardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.