Isbn: 9780199261659 - nondescriptive meaning and reference: an ideational semantics (26 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: Near Fine. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Near Fine. 1st Edition. xiii,450. Small pen mark (.25 inch) at the top edge. Dust at the top edge. Jacket shows shelfwear, but is fully intact and now protected by a removable clear plastic sleeve. Small pencil markings at the upper right corner of the flyleaf. Otherwise pristine. A very nice copy. Bound in black cloth, with stamped gold lettering to the spine. If you order this from outside the United States, we will almost certainly request an additional payment to help cover the postage. Please feel welcome to message us with any questions, or a request for photographs. Every order includes tracking and is wrapped and robustly packaged with care in Tucson, AZ. ~Mesquite Booksellers.…

Condición: Fair. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. Book contains pencil markings. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,900grams, ISBN:9780199261659.…

Hard Cover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. First Edition. From an academic library with the usual stamps etc. .This item is heavy and will attract postal surcharges. A00015762.

hardcover. Condición: Acceptable. Connecting readers with great books since 1972. Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have condition issues including wear and notes/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority.

Hardcover Sep 01, 2005. Condición: gebraucht; wie neu. Stempel von der Bibliothek Uni-Bern am Vorsatzblatt, ansonsten ungebraucht, nicht foliert, ungelesen.

Hardcover. Condición: New. 1st Edition. New book, never read. Pages clean and crisp, spine unbroken. 0423B.

Condición: New. Presents a different approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called 'expression' theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. This book argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. Num Pages: 466 pages, 4 tables, 2 line drawings. BIC Classification: CFA; CFG; HPM; JMR. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 165 x 31. Weight in Grams: 840. . 2005. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . .…

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. Presents a different approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called 'expression' theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. This book argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. Num Pages: 466 pages, 4 tables, 2 line drawings. BIC Classification: CFA; CFG; HPM; JMR. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 242 x 165 x 31. Weight in Grams: 840. . 2005. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Condición: New.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Condición: New. Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference extends Wayne Davis's groundbreaking work on the foundations of semantics. Davis revives the classical doctrine that meaning consists in the expression of ideas, and advances the expression theory by showing how it can account for standard proper names, and the distinctive way their meaning determines their reference. He also shows how the theory can handle interjections, syncategorematic terms, conventional implicatures, and other cases long seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories. The expression theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, and that thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude, distinct from belief and desire. Thought parts ('ideas' or 'concepts') are distinguished from both sensory images and conceptions. Word meaning is defined recursively: sentences and other complex expressions mean what they do in virtue of what thought parts their component words express and what thought structure the linguistic structure expresses; and unstructured words mean what they do in living languages in virtue of evolving conventions to use them to express ideas. The difficulties of descriptivism show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. The reference of a name is the extension of the idea it expresses, which is determined not by causal relations, but by its identity or content together with the nature of objects in the world. Hence a name's reference is dependent on, but not identical to, its meaning. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. The expression theory thus has the strength of Fregeanism without its descriptivist bias, and of Millianism without its referentialist or causalist shortcomings. The referential properties of ideas can be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semantic value of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its components. Davis also shows how referential properties can be treated using situation semantics and possible worlds semantics. The key is to drop the assumption that the values of intension functions are the referents of the words whose meaning they represent, and to abandon the necessity of identity for logical modalities. Many other pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, such as the twin earth arguments, are shown to be unfounded.…

Hardback. Condición: New. Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference extends Wayne Davis's groundbreaking work on the foundations of semantics. Davis revives the classical doctrine that meaning consists in the expression of ideas, and advances the expression theory by showing how it can account for standard proper names, and the distinctive way their meaning determines their reference. He also shows how the theory can handle interjections, syncategorematic terms, conventional implicatures, and other cases long seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories. The expression theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, and that thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude, distinct from belief and desire. Thought parts ('ideas' or 'concepts') are distinguished from both sensory images and conceptions. Word meaning is defined recursively: sentences and other complex expressions mean what they do in virtue of what thought parts their component words express and what thought structure the linguistic structure expresses; and unstructured words mean what they do in living languages in virtue of evolving conventions to use them to express ideas. The difficulties of descriptivism show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. The reference of a name is the extension of the idea it expresses, which is determined not by causal relations, but by its identity or content together with the nature of objects in the world. Hence a name's reference is dependent on, but not identical to, its meaning. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. The expression theory thus has the strength of Fregeanism without its descriptivist bias, and of Millianism without its referentialist or causalist shortcomings. The referential properties of ideas can be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semantic value of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its components. Davis also shows how referential properties can be treated using situation semantics and possible worlds semantics. The key is to drop the assumption that the values of intension functions are the referents of the words whose meaning they represent, and to abandon the necessity of identity for logical modalities. Many other pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, such as the twin earth arguments, are shown to be unfounded.…

Hardcover. Condición: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference extends Wayne Davis's groundbreaking work on the foundations of semantics. Davis revives the classical doctrine that meaning consists in the expression of ideas, and advances the expression theory by showing how it can account for standard proper names, and the distinctive way their meaning determines their reference. He also shows how the theory can handle interjections, syncategorematic terms, conventionalimplicatures, and other cases long seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories.The expression theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, andthat thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude, distinct from belief and desire. Thought parts ('ideas' or 'concepts') are distinguished from both sensory images and conceptions. Word meaning is defined recursively: sentences and other complex expressions mean what they do in virtue of what thought parts their component words express and what thought structure the linguistic structure expresses; and unstructured words mean what they do in living languages in virtue of evolvingconventions to use them to express ideas. The difficulties of descriptivism show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. The reference of a name is the extension of the idea it expresses, which isdetermined not by causal relations, but by its identity or content together with the nature of objects in the world. Hence a name's reference is dependent on, but not identical to, its meaning. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. The expression theory thus has the strength of Fregeanism without its descriptivist bias, and of Millianism without its referentialist or causalistshortcomings.The referential properties of ideas can be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semanticvalue of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its components. Davis also shows how referential properties can be treated using situation semantics and possible worlds semantics. The key is to drop the assumption that the values of intension functions are the referents of the words whose meaning they represent, and to abandon the necessity of identity for logical modalities. Many other pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, such as the twin earth arguments, are shownto be unfounded. Presents a different approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called 'expression' theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. This book argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference extends Wayne Davis's groundbreaking work on the foundations of semantics. Davis revives the classical doctrine that meaning consists in the expression of ideas, and advances the expression theory by showing how it can account for standard proper names, and the distinctive way their meaning determines their reference. He also shows how the theory can handle interjections, syncategorematic terms, conventionalimplicatures, and other cases long seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories.The expression theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, andthat thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude, distinct from belief and desire. Thought parts ('ideas' or 'concepts') are distinguished from both sensory images and conceptions. Word meaning is defined recursively: sentences and other complex expressions mean what they do in virtue of what thought parts their component words express and what thought structure the linguistic structure expresses; and unstructured words mean what they do in living languages in virtue of evolvingconventions to use them to express ideas. The difficulties of descriptivism show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. The reference of a name is the extension of the idea it expresses, which isdetermined not by causal relations, but by its identity or content together with the nature of objects in the world. Hence a name's reference is dependent on, but not identical to, its meaning. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. The expression theory thus has the strength of Fregeanism without its descriptivist bias, and of Millianism without its referentialist or causalistshortcomings.The referential properties of ideas can be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semanticvalue of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its components. Davis also shows how referential properties can be treated using situation semantics and possible worlds semantics. The key is to drop the assumption that the values of intension functions are the referents of the words whose meaning they represent, and to abandon the necessity of identity for logical modalities. Many other pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, such as the twin earth arguments, are shownto be unfounded. Presents a different approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called 'expression' theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. This book argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference extends Wayne Davis's groundbreaking work on the foundations of semantics. Davis revives the classical doctrine that meaning consists in the expression of ideas, and advances the expression theory by showing how it can account for standard proper names, and the distinctive way their meaning determines their reference. He also shows how the theory can handle interjections, syncategorematic terms, conventionalimplicatures, and other cases long seen as difficult for both ideational and referential theories.The expression theory is founded on the fact that thoughts are event types with a constituent structure, andthat thinking is a fundamental propositional attitude, distinct from belief and desire. Thought parts ('ideas' or 'concepts') are distinguished from both sensory images and conceptions. Word meaning is defined recursively: sentences and other complex expressions mean what they do in virtue of what thought parts their component words express and what thought structure the linguistic structure expresses; and unstructured words mean what they do in living languages in virtue of evolvingconventions to use them to express ideas. The difficulties of descriptivism show that the ideas expressed by names are atomic or basic. The reference of a name is the extension of the idea it expresses, which isdetermined not by causal relations, but by its identity or content together with the nature of objects in the world. Hence a name's reference is dependent on, but not identical to, its meaning. A name is directly and rigidly referential because the extension of the idea it expresses is not determined by the extensions of component ideas. The expression theory thus has the strength of Fregeanism without its descriptivist bias, and of Millianism without its referentialist or causalistshortcomings.The referential properties of ideas can be set out recursively by providing a generative theory of ideas, assigning extensions to atomic ideas, and formulating rules whereby the semanticvalue of a complex idea is determined by the semantic values of its components. Davis also shows how referential properties can be treated using situation semantics and possible worlds semantics. The key is to drop the assumption that the values of intension functions are the referents of the words whose meaning they represent, and to abandon the necessity of identity for logical modalities. Many other pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, such as the twin earth arguments, are shownto be unfounded. Presents a different approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called 'expression' theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. This book argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Buch. Condición: Neu. Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference | An Ideational Semantics | Wayne Davis (u. a.) | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2005 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199261659 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 466.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 466 Illus.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 466.