9780199243273 - An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts de Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David (25 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: Fair. This book has been liquid damaged; but is still totally usable!!!

gebundene Ausgabe. Condición: Gut. Auflage: 2. 287 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 565.

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Condición: New. In.

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Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New. This is an updated graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The exercises that test students' understanding are extended for each chapter. Translator(s): Watt, Richard. Num Pages: 301 pages, numerous line drawings. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 240 x 163 x 23. Weight in Grams: 584. . 2001. 2nd Edition. hardcover. . . . .

Condición: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 304 | Sprache: Spanisch | Produktart: Bücher | This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each chapter.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Condición: New. 2nd. In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business.After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling.The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.

Condición: New. This is an updated graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The exercises that test students' understanding are extended for each chapter. Translator(s): Watt, Richard. Num Pages: 301 pages, numerous line drawings. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 240 x 163 x 23. Weight in Grams: 584. . 2001. 2nd Edition. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Hardback. Condición: New. 2nd. In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business.After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling.The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.

Condición: gut. 2001. An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts In englischer Sprache. pages.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 2nd edition. 301 pages. 9.45x6.30x0.94 inches. In Stock.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book iswritten for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business.After an introduction tothe subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling.The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theorybefore moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extendedexercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems. This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book iswritten for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business.After an introduction tothe subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling.The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theorybefore moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extendedexercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems. This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book iswritten for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business.After an introduction tothe subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling.The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theorybefore moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extendedexercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems. This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each chapter.

Buch. Condición: Neu. An Introduction to the Economics of Information | Incentives and Contracts | Ines Macho-Stadler (u. a.) | Buch | Gebunden | Spanisch | 2001 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199243273 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 304.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 304 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 304.