Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: More Than Words, Waltham, MA, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 51,21
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: Good. . Former Library book. All orders guaranteed and ship within 24 hours. Before placing your order for please contact us for confirmation on the book's binding. Check out our other listings to add to your order for discounted shipping.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Reino Unido
EUR 92,41
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,1400grams, ISBN:9780195300796.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 133,60
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino Unido
EUR 123,78
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. In.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 139,29
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Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 123,77
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Reino Unido
EUR 137,67
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Añadir al carritoCondición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Librería: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Reino Unido
EUR 247,52
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: Brand New. illustrated edition. 672 pages. 10.25x7.25x1.50 inches. In Stock.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press Inc, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de America
EUR 135,97
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press Inc, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Reino Unido
EUR 128,45
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Reino Unido
EUR 132,96
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem andreputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments,including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basicresearch in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research. This book provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and coninuing to research frontier. Detailed theoretical arguments are complemented by copious exmaples and economic applications of the theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Oxford University Press, 2006
ISBN 10: 0195300793 ISBN 13: 9780195300796
Librería: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italia
EUR 162,87
Cantidad disponible: Más de 20 disponibles
Añadir al carritoCondición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
EUR 170,73
Cantidad disponible: 1 disponibles
Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Librería: preigu, Osnabrück, Alemania
EUR 192,40
Cantidad disponible: 5 disponibles
Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS C | Mailath | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2018 | ACADEMIC | EAN 9780195300796 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.