sabri aydin (8 resultados)

Condición: New. pp. 84.

paperback. Condición: New. NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This study investigates how the nuclear tension between Iran and the US is likely to result. Game theoretical analyses are applied in order to develop the argument of this study. Interaction between the US and Iran is analyzed by using two different forms of games, complete and incomplete information; and two different methods, backwards induction and Bayes s theorem. It is concluded that Iran s nuclear pursuit is mostly security based and the nuclear tension between Iran and the US creates a vicious circle. While Iran is going for nuclear weapons primarily to protect itself against the enemy states, the US challenge to Iran s nuclear pursuit poses a security threat to Iran and makes Iranians much more eager to develop their own nuclear weapon capability. If Iranians are not bluffing and if they are determined to get the nuclear weapons, primarily because of security considerations, sooner or later Iran will have them. On the other hand, if the Mullahs intend to use their nuclear program as a leverage in their bargain with the West, they can only be persuaded to give up only by guaranteeing the security of the Islamic Regime. 84 pp. Englisch.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 84 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 84.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: AYDIN SabriHe is a Phd candidate and working as a research assistant in the department of international relations in Uludag University Bursa, Turkey. He is interested in the studies on nuclear weapons proliferation and quantitative a.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This study investigates how the nuclear tension between Iran and the US is likely to result. Game theoretical analyses are applied in order to develop the argument of this study. Interaction between the US and Iran is analyzed by using two different forms of games, complete and incomplete information; and two different methods, backwards induction and Bayes's theorem. It is concluded that Iran's nuclear pursuit is mostly security based and the nuclear tension between Iran and the US creates a vicious circle. While Iran is going for nuclear weapons primarily to protect itself against the enemy states, the US challenge to Iran's nuclear pursuit poses a security threat to Iran and makes Iranians much more eager to develop their own nuclear weapon capability. If Iranians are not bluffing and if they are determined to get the nuclear weapons, primarily because of security considerations, sooner or later Iran will have them. On the other hand, if the Mullahs intend to use their nuclear program as a leverage in their bargain with the West, they can only be persuaded to give up only by guaranteeing the security of the Islamic Regime.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 84 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This study investigates how the nuclear tension between Iran and the US is likely to result. Game theoretical analyses are applied in order to develop the argument of this study. Interaction between the US and Iran is analyzed by using two different forms of games, complete and incomplete information; and two different methods, backwards induction and Bayes s theorem. It is concluded that Iran s nuclear pursuit is mostly security based and the nuclear tension between Iran and the US creates a vicious circle. While Iran is going for nuclear weapons primarily to protect itself against the enemy states, the US challenge to Iran s nuclear pursuit poses a security threat to Iran and makes Iranians much more eager to develop their own nuclear weapon capability. If Iranians are not bluffing and if they are determined to get the nuclear weapons, primarily because of security considerations, sooner or later Iran will have them. On the other hand, if the Mullahs intend to use their nuclear program as a leverage in their bargain with the West, they can only be persuaded to give up only by guaranteeing the security of the Islamic Regime.