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Añadir al carritoXXXIII, 242 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Theory and decision library : Series C, Game theory, mathematical programming and operations research ; Vol. 45. Sprache: Englisch.
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Publicado por Verlag, 1983
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Añadir al carritoHardcover. Condición: VG/VG/VG. A gray casebound book. There is a red dust jacket with black text on the spine. There is an onion skin jacket over that. the end pages are illustrated. Pages: (10), 11-66, (2). Illustrated in black-and-white. There is a 28 page staplebound pamphlet in a pocket on the back inside cover, which has several color illustrations.
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Añadir al carritoPaperback. Condición: Brand New. reprint edition. 276 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.65 inches. In Stock.
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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016
ISBN 10: 3662513145 ISBN 13: 9783662513149
Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.
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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations | Holger I. Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | viii | Englisch | 2002 | Springer | EAN 9783540432951 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
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Añadir al carritoTaschenbuch. Condición: Neu. The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games | An Exercise in Algorithmic Game Theory | Holger Ingmar Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Theory and Decision Library C | xxxiii | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9783662513149 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
Librería: CSG Onlinebuch GMBH, Darmstadt, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoSoftcover. Condición: Gut. Gebraucht - Gut Zustand: Gut, VIII, 205 pp. About this book: The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered. Written for researchers.
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Añadir al carritoCondición: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 276 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.
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EUR 125,35
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EUR 50,48
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Añadir al carritoCondición: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.
Librería: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Reino Unido
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