Kulp christopher b (59 resultados)

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Paperback. Condición: Near Fine. Reprint. 5.83 X 0.64 X 8.27 inches; 279 pages.

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. 24×16cm. Navy cloth. The book has been cleaned. There's no writing in the text, and the condition is good.

Condición: New.

Binding sound, text unmarked. Condición: Fine. No dustwrapper. Robust packaging. Tracking is always added to USA orders. It can be added to other overseas orders on request. Used books are exempt from USA tariffs. 1st edition. No ownership marks. Size: viii, 210pp. No ownership marks.

Paperback. Condición: New. This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as (non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments seriously-judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above. Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier, the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any conception of morality substantially at odds with the general contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.…

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: Fine. No Jacket. 1st Edition. Hardcover. No jacket as issued. vi,210pp. Fine condition. Review slip laid in. Bound in blue/gray cloth, with stamped gold lettering to the spine and front board. Dimensions: 6.25 x 9.5 x .875 inches. Weight: 534 grams. If you order this from outside the United States, we are likely to request an additional payment to help cover the postage. Every order includes tracking and is wrapped and robustly packaged with care in Tucson, AZ. ~Mesquite Booksellers.…

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 175 pages. 8.75x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Condición: Fine. 224p.

Condición: New. pp. 222 Index.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

PF. Condición: New.

Condición: New. pp. 222 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Paperback. Condición: New. This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as (non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments seriously-judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above. Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier, the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any conception of morality substantially at odds with the general contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.…

Condición: New. pp. 279.

Condición: New.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This is a book on metaethics-in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge-that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong-the book goes on to examine the metaphysical grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism, Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism, and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsensemoral thought.…

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 268 pages. 8.25x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.