Heather logue (35 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Very Good. Minimal shelf wear, clean internals. Remainder mark.

Paperback. Condición: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Condición: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Library sticker on front cover. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,600grams, ISBN:9780262524902.…

Condición: New.

Soft cover. Condición: Fine. Softcover. xxx,334. Fine condition. A little dust at the top edge. One small spot at the bottom edge. Minor ordinary shelfwear to the covers and edges. If you order this from outside the United States, we are almost certain to request an additional payment to help cover the postage. Dimensions: 6 x 9 x .625 inches. Weight: 493 grams. Every order includes tracking and is wrapped and robustly packaged with care in Tucson, AZ. ~Mesquite Booksellers.…

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. In Stock.

Condición: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condición: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . .

Paperback. Condición: Used: Acceptable. Ref ZKVQ Condition good, clean. A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brain activity constant. Although you notice no change, disjunctivists argue that the preremoval and postremoval experiences are radically different. Disjunctivism has gained prominent supporters in recent years, as well as attracting much criticism. This reader collects for the first time in one volume classic texts that define and react to disjunctivism. These include an excerpt from a book by the late J. M. Hinton, who was the first to propose an explicitly disjunctivist position, and papers stating a number of important objections. Contributors: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Dancy, J. M. Hinton, Mark Johnston, Harold Langsam, Heather Logue, M. G. F. Martin, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Paul Snowdon. "[ Disjunctivism], a reprinting of some of the most important articles on disjunctivism, shows how the history of disjunctivism developed." Tim Crane Times Literary Supplement Alex Byrne is Professor of Philosophy at MIT and the coeditor of Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson (2001) and Readings on Color, volumes 1 and 2 (1997), all published by the MIT Press. Heather Logue is a graduate student in Philosophy at MIT. Size: 22.6 x 15.2 x 2.8 cm.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - This Element brings three topics into closer contact: scepticism about the external world, the metaphysics of perception, and the epistemology of perception. It argues that a certain kind of response to external world scepticism is significantly stronger if we make certain theoretical commitments regarding the metaphysics and epistemology of perception. I argue that a neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivist response to scepticism is much more compelling when underpinned by a naïve realist theory of perceptual phenomenal character and the transparency model of how we acquire knowledge of our perceptual states. The possibility that these theories are true radically alters the dialectical situation with respect to external world scepticism: the sceptical argument is on much shakier ground than is usually appreciated. Integrating our theorising about our knowledge of the external world and our theorising about the metaphysics and epistemology of perception affords a more comprehensive view of our anti-sceptical options.…

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Condición: Very Good.

Condición: New. 2026. hardcover. . . . . .

Condición: New. 2026. hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

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HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: new.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. In Stock.

Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by highly polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naive realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute, for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called 'high-level' properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses. The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarizationstems from insufficient attention to how we should go about settling these debates. In general, there is widespread, largely implicit disagreement concerning what philosophical theories of perception aresupposed to explain, the claims that we should hold fixed in the course of theorizing, and the methods that such theorizing should employ. The goal of this volume is to move such methodological questions from the background to the front of the debate, in the hope of facilitating progress. The contributions constitute an initial effort to spur more explicit, systematic discussion of methodology in philosophy of perception, covering a wide range of relevant topics, from the relation betweenscientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception. This volume presents a collection of chapters examining fundamental assumptions of contemporary debates in the philosophy of perception. The chapters cover a wide range of topics, from the relation between scientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New.

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 304 pages. 9.49x6.34x0.94 inches. In Stock.

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Condición: New.

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Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - This Element brings three topics into closer contact: scepticism about the external world, the metaphysics of perception, and the epistemology of perception. It argues that a certain kind of response to external world scepticism is significantly stronger if we make certain theoretical commitments regarding the metaphysics and epistemology of perception. I argue that a neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivist response to scepticism is much more compelling when underpinned by a naïve realist theory of perceptual phenomenal character and the transparency model of how we acquire knowledge of our perceptual states. The possibility that these theories are true radically alters the dialectical situation with respect to external world scepticism: the sceptical argument is on much shakier ground than is usually appreciated. Integrating our theorising about our knowledge of the external world and our theorising about the metaphysics and epistemology of perception affords a more comprehensive view of our anti-sceptical options.…

Hardcover. Condición: Brand New. 304 pages. 9.49x6.34x0.94 inches. In Stock.

Condición: New.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by highly polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naïve realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute, for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called 'high-level' properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses. The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarization stems from insufficient attention to how we should go about settling these debates. In general, there is widespread, largely implicit disagreement concerning what philosophical theories of perception are supposed to explain, the claims that we should hold fixed in the course of theorizing, and the methods that such theorizing should employ. The goal of this volume is to move such methodological questions from the background to the front of the debate, in the hope of facilitating progress. The contributions constitute an initial effort to spur more explicit, systematic discussion of methodology in philosophy of perception, covering a wide range of relevant topics, from the relation between scientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception. …