detlefsen m (29 resultados)

SC. Condición: Gut. Obr., [KKAP7]. Deu 400g.

Hardcover. Condición: Sehr gut. m. farbigen Zeichn Ilustrador. S. 64.

20 cm. original softcover. viii,116 pp. -(very) good. 150g.

Hardcover. Condición: Very Good. Estado de la sobrecubierta: No Dust Jacket. First Edition; First Printing. Lacking Dustjacket. First Edition, First Printing (No additional printings stated). Very Good with light wear to covers and no marks to text. Math; Synthese Library, 182; 8vo 8" - 9" tall; 200 pages.

hardcover. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title!

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New. In.

Condición: New. pp. 204.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.

Condición: New. pp. 252.

Condición: New. pp. 268.

Condición: New. pp. 252.

Condición: New. pp. 268.

x,241pp. with dust jacket. fine.

Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling. 204 pp. Englisch.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Hilbert s Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws acc.

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Hilbert s Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws acc.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 204 23:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 204.

Buch. Condición: Neu. Hilbert's Program | An Essay on Mathematical Instrumentalism | M. Detlefsen | Buch | xiv | Englisch | 1986 | Springer | EAN 9789027721518 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 204 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 204 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling. 204 pp. Englisch.

Condición: New. pp. 268 9:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam This item is printed on demand.

Condición: New. pp. 252 44:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam This item is printed on demand.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Michael Detlefsen (Edited by)These questions arise from any attempt to discover an epistemology for mathematics. This collection of essays considers various questions concerning the nature of justification in mathematics and possible sources of t.

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Michael Detlefsen (Edited by)The mathematical proof is the most important form of justification in mathematics. It is not, however, the only kind of justification for mathematical propositions. The existence of other forms, some of very significant .