bonvecchi alejandro (54 resultados)

Condición: New. Estado de la sobrecubierta: Nuevo.

Paperback. Condición: New. This book investigates who decides on social policy combining political economy and social network analysis of social policy formulation processes. Case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that societal actors are the main influences in South America while governmental actors are in the Caribbean countries.

Condición: New.

Paperback or Softback. Condición: New. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism. Book.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book investigates who decides on social policy combining political economy and social network analysis of social policy formulation processes. Case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that societal actors are the main influences in South America while governmental actors are in the Caribbean countries. Investigates who decides on social policy combining political economy and social network analysis of social policy formulation processes. Case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that societal actors are the main influences in South America while governmental actors are in the Caribbean countries. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: New. Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condición: New. Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

paperback. Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . .

Condición: New. 2020. paperback. . . . . .

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Encuadernación de tapa blanda. Condición: Bien. R500986. ariel - 494pp DE UNA CRISIS CAMBIARIA A OTRA, DE UN DEFAULT AL QUE LE SIGUE ARG.

Condición: New. 2026. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condición: New.

Condición: New. 2020. paperback. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 314 pages. 6.00x0.66x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain. Explains why legislatures in autocracies are organized differently and have varying degrees of influence on policies. An ideal resource for students of comparative politics, specialists on Argentina, Brazil, and Spain, and practitioners looking to understand how lawmaking works within dictatorships. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: New. Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.

Paperback. Condición: New. This book investigates who decides on social policy combining political economy and social network analysis of social policy formulation processes. Case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that societal actors are the main influences in South America while governmental actors are in the Caribbean countries.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. This book investigates who decides on social policy combining political economy and social network analysis of social policy formulation processes. Case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that societal actors are the main influences in South America while governmental actors are in the Caribbean countries. Investigates who decides on social policy combining political economy and social network analysis of social policy formulation processes. Case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, The Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago show that societal actors are the main influences in South America while governmental actors are in the Caribbean countries. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain. Explains why legislatures in autocracies are organized differently and have varying degrees of influence on policies. An ideal resource for students of comparative politics, specialists on Argentina, Brazil, and Spain, and practitioners looking to understand how lawmaking works within dictatorships. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.

Paperback. Condición: New. Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.

Condición: New.

Condición: New.

Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.