ISBN: 9798182111140 - bhrm chapter 7: human errors and river navigation: 8 (bridge human resource management) (6 resultados)

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Chapter 7 Human Errors and River Navigation7.1 Human error- One man error - Decision making process7.2 memory and human element chartKnowledge - based Errors: Often Dismissed as "Amusing"On Emotional - Driven Violations and Their ConsequencesCase Studies: When Skill Gaps Lead to Catastrophe7.3 Intuition - Basic Errors and Memory - Based ErrorsCase Study: The Tenerife Airport Disaster (1977)Basic Errors and Their Consequences in ShippingCase study: Exxon Valdez incident7.4 Decision Making ProcessWorking Habits: The Automatic Decision Maker ComplacencyOne case of application of decision makingforces act on each turning stage[some points to adhere to in river navigation to avoid the collision and grounding.What happened in turningTurning in Four Stages in congested waterHow to steady the COG?7.6 Ultimate river channel safetyChapter 7 Human Errors Acros Marine accidents are often framed as inevitable, given the uniquely harsh operational environment of the maritime industry. Challenges such as extreme weather (storms, high waves, strong winds), navigational hazards (shallow waters, blind navigation zones, draft restrictions), and the physical limitations of vessels (massive size, sluggish maneuverability, momentum from ultra-heavy cargo) are collectively described as force majeure-unavoidable natural forces that test both crew and equipment. With so many variables at sea, a zero-accident record is, in theory, unattainable.Yet these challenges do not render humans powerless. As one LNG-tanker company manager advised his successor, approximately 90% of maritime accidents stem from human factors: about 60% from direct errors (misjudgments or procedural lapses) and 30% from indirect human-element issues (inadequate training or organizational culture). For high-risk vessels like LNG carriers-highlighted by tragedies such as the Sanchi collision-even minor incidents can escalate into catastrophic consequences. While other ship types may tolerate occasional mishaps, incidents rooted in human error pose a universal threat across all maritime sectors.The Cultural Construction of ErrorNotions of error are not intrinsic; they are socially and culturally constructed. Figure 7-01 illustrates six cognitive elements tied to human error-fundamental aspects of brain function such as attention, memory, and decision-making. When any of these falter (for example, due to inattentiveness or flawed risk assessment), errors or violations can occur, often requiring significant resources to rectify.Cultural norms further shape how errors are perceived and tolerated. In some societies, extended parental support for adult children is viewed as a natural obligation, while in others it may be seen as overindulgence. In extreme cultural or ideological contexts, actions outsiders deem erroneous (for example, high-risk behaviors framed as morally imperative) may be normalized within a group, leading to substantial sacrifices. In maritime settings, seafarers' ingrained routines or habits-shaped by workplace culture-can obscure risks, making deviations appear unproblematic. Culture functions as a group's collective memory, legitimizing behaviors that might otherwise be flagged as hazardous. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Chapter 7 Human Errors and River Navigation7.1 Human error- One man error - Decision making process7.2 memory and human element chartKnowledge - based Errors: Often Dismissed as "Amusing"On Emotional - Driven Violations and Their ConsequencesCase Studies: When Skill Gaps Lead to Catastrophe7.3 Intuition - Basic Errors and Memory - Based ErrorsCase Study: The Tenerife Airport Disaster (1977)Basic Errors and Their Consequences in ShippingCase study: Exxon Valdez incident7.4 Decision Making ProcessWorking Habits: The Automatic Decision Maker ComplacencyOne case of application of decision makingforces act on each turning stage[some points to adhere to in river navigation to avoid the collision and grounding.What happened in turningTurning in Four Stages in congested waterHow to steady the COG?7.6 Ultimate river channel safetyChapter 7 Human Errors Acros Marine accidents are often framed as inevitable, given the uniquely harsh operational environment of the maritime industry. Challenges such as extreme weather (storms, high waves, strong winds), navigational hazards (shallow waters, blind navigation zones, draft restrictions), and the physical limitations of vessels (massive size, sluggish maneuverability, momentum from ultra-heavy cargo) are collectively described as force majeure-unavoidable natural forces that test both crew and equipment. With so many variables at sea, a zero-accident record is, in theory, unattainable.Yet these challenges do not render humans powerless. As one LNG-tanker company manager advised his successor, approximately 90% of maritime accidents stem from human factors: about 60% from direct errors (misjudgments or procedural lapses) and 30% from indirect human-element issues (inadequate training or organizational culture). For high-risk vessels like LNG carriers-highlighted by tragedies such as the Sanchi collision-even minor incidents can escalate into catastrophic consequences. While other ship types may tolerate occasional mishaps, incidents rooted in human error pose a universal threat across all maritime sectors.The Cultural Construction of ErrorNotions of error are not intrinsic; they are socially and culturally constructed. Figure 7-01 illustrates six cognitive elements tied to human error-fundamental aspects of brain function such as attention, memory, and decision-making. When any of these falter (for example, due to inattentiveness or flawed risk assessment), errors or violations can occur, often requiring significant resources to rectify.Cultural norms further shape how errors are perceived and tolerated. In some societies, extended parental support for adult children is viewed as a natural obligation, while in others it may be seen as overindulgence. In extreme cultural or ideological contexts, actions outsiders deem erroneous (for example, high-risk behaviors framed as morally imperative) may be normalized within a group, leading to substantial sacrifices. In maritime settings, seafarers' ingrained routines or habits-shaped by workplace culture-can obscure risks, making deviations appear unproblematic. Culture functions as a group's collective memory, legitimizing behaviors that might otherwise be flagged as hazardous. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…