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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this 'classic' problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players' horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.
Librería: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italia
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Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer Nature Singapore Okt 2016, 2016
ISBN 10: 9811015449 ISBN 13: 9789811015441
Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this 'classic' problem in game theory. This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players' horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences. 536 pp. Englisch.
Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoCondición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Provides a comprehensive coverage of subgame consistent cooperationPresents solution techniques for complex subgame consistent cooperation Equips readers to design sustainable collaboration plansIllustrates applications in .
Librería: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Reino Unido
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Librería: preigu, Osnabrück, Alemania
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Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. Subgame Consistent Cooperation | A Comprehensive Treatise | David W. K. Yeung (u. a.) | Buch | xiv | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9789811015441 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.
Idioma: Inglés
Publicado por Springer, Springer Okt 2016, 2016
ISBN 10: 9811015449 ISBN 13: 9789811015441
Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemania
EUR 106,99
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Añadir al carritoBuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this ¿classic¿ problem in game theory.This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players¿ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 536 pp. Englisch.
Librería: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Alemania
EUR 165,69
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