Isbn: 9783869558172 - experiments on the fragility of cooperation and mechanisms to overcome this problem (6 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Sehr gut. 1. Aufl. XII, 120 S.; Ill. Very good. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 300.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. 140 pp. Englisch.…

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextrnrnIn experimental economics cooperation is frequently modelednby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict thenproblem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant butnthat there are individual incentives .…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict theproblem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant butthat there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest nopersonal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-goodexperiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfectconditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilitiesreputation-building or communication are absent.We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For examplewe introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyzewhether subjects behave differently when they do not receivenew resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We furtherprovide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-ridingproblem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second studywith a non-linear production function. However, the costlyimplementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a(second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linearpublic-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit onpunishment.Cuvillier Verlag, Nonnenstieg 8, 37075 Göttingen 140 pp. Englisch.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Experiments on the Fragility of Cooperation and Mechanisms to Overcome this Problem | Stefan Grosse | Taschenbuch | Englisch | 2011 | Cuvillier | EAN 9783869558172 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …