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Stefan Grosse
Publicado por Cuvillier Jul 2011, 2011
ISBN 10: 3869558172 ISBN 13: 9783869558172
Nuevo Taschenbuch
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Librería: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Alemania

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Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. 140 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783869558172

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Grosse, Stefan
Publicado por Cuvillier Verlag, 2011
ISBN 10: 3869558172 ISBN 13: 9783869558172
Nuevo Tapa blanda
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Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemania

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Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextrnrnIn experimental economics cooperation is frequently modelednby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict thenproblem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant butnthat there are individual incentives . Nº de ref. del artículo: 118877132

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Stefan Grosse
Publicado por Cuvillier, Cuvillier Jul 2011, 2011
ISBN 10: 3869558172 ISBN 13: 9783869558172
Nuevo Taschenbuch

Librería: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Alemania

Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas Valoración 5 estrellas, Más información sobre las valoraciones de los vendedores

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware -In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. 140 pp. Englisch. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783869558172

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Stefan Grosse
Publicado por Cuvillier
ISBN 10: 3869558172 ISBN 13: 9783869558172
Nuevo Taschenbuch
Impresión bajo demanda

Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Alemania

Calificación del vendedor: 5 de 5 estrellas Valoración 5 estrellas, Más información sobre las valoraciones de los vendedores

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeledby a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities, reputation-building or communication are absent. We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study with a non-linear production function. However, the costly implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a (second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on punishment. Nº de ref. del artículo: 9783869558172

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