Isbn: 9783659416293 - relational contracts and reputational games: the role of informal agreements in supporting business relations (8 resultados)

Condición: New. pp. 88.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Relational Contracts and Reputational Games | The Role of Informal Agreements in Supporting Business Relations | Dario G. De Maio | Taschenbuch | 88 S. | Englisch | 2018 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783659416293 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Relational contracts are defined as the set of unwritten codes of conduct that affects parties behavior during a business. The existence of these 'contracts' is motivated by the impossibility of predicting all the contingencies that may occur after a formal agreement is stipulated. As widely recognized in the economic literature, the incompleteness of written contracts can give rise to opportunistic behaviors of a party, that reduce the margins for the conclusion of efficient transactions. The adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up problems are typical examples of contractual opportunism. This book provides an essay on the important role that informal mechanisms may have in mitigating contractual incompleteness and supporting transactions. The basic literature is followed by a formal model aimed at studying the incentives that reputation can generate on the firm's decision to invest in the quality of its products. The ultimate scope of the book is to shed some light on business practices and provide discussion materials to the industrial organization scholars community. 88 pp. Englisch.…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 88 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Relational contracts are defined as the set of unwritten codes of conduct that affects parties behavior during a business. The existence of these 'contracts' is motivated by the impossibility of predicting all the contingencies that may occur after a formal agreement is stipulated. As widely recognized in the economic literature, the incompleteness of written contracts can give rise to opportunistic behaviors of a party, that reduce the margins for the conclusion of efficient transactions. The adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up problems are typical examples of contractual opportunism. This book provides an essay on the important role that informal mechanisms may have in mitigating contractual incompleteness and supporting transactions. The basic literature is followed by a formal model aimed at studying the incentives that reputation can generate on the firm's decision to invest in the quality of its products. The ultimate scope of the book is to shed some light on business practices and provide discussion materials to the industrial organization scholars community.…

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 88.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: De Maio Dario G.Dario G. De Maio currently works as economist at the Department of Regulatory Affairs at Terna S.p.a. and as professional consultant at the Authority for Electricity and Gas in Italy. He is also a Phd Student at IMT I.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Relational contracts are defined as the set of unwritten codes of conduct that affects parties behavior during a business. The existence of these 'contracts' is motivated by the impossibility of predicting all the contingencies that may occur after a formal agreement is stipulated. As widely recognized in the economic literature, the incompleteness of written contracts can give rise to opportunistic behaviors of a party, that reduce the margins for the conclusion of efficient transactions. The adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up problems are typical examples of contractual opportunism. This book provides an essay on the important role that informal mechanisms may have in mitigating contractual incompleteness and supporting transactions. The basic literature is followed by a formal model aimed at studying the incentives that reputation can generate on the firm's decision to invest in the quality of its products. The ultimate scope of the book is to shed some light on business practices and provide discussion materials to the industrial organization scholars community.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 88 pp. Englisch.…