Isbn: 9780792394709 - incentive regulation and the regulation of incentives: 17 (topics in regulatory economics and policy, 17) (14 resultados)

gebundene Ausgabe. Condición: Gut. 133 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sehr sauber und kann entsprechende Merkmale aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 415.

Hardcover. Condición: Good. No Jacket. x, 133 p.

Condición: New. In English.

Condición: New. Explores public utility regulation using an economic framework of regulation. This framework allows the reader to understand what a regulator must do to maximize the economic benefits to consumers. This book is useful for academics interested in the study of regulation. Series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy. Num Pages: 133 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCC; KJU. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 9. Weight in Grams: 393. . 1994. Hardback. . . . . …

Condición: New. pp. 152.

Condición: New. Explores public utility regulation using an economic framework of regulation. This framework allows the reader to understand what a regulator must do to maximize the economic benefits to consumers. This book is useful for academics interested in the study of regulation. Series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy. Num Pages: 133 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCC; KJU. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 9. Weight in Grams: 393. . 1994. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Condición: gut. 1994. Incentive Regulation and the Regulation of Incentives. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, Band 17. In englischer Sprache. pages.

Hardcover. Condición: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The 'regulatory problem' was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena. 152 pp. Englisch.…

Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm s costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The regulatory problem was reduced to a mere pricing problem..…

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 152 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 152.

Buch. Condición: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The 'regulatory problem' was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 152 pp. Englisch.…

Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The 'regulatory problem' was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.…