ISBN: 9780226435312 - the logic of delegation (american politics and political economy series) (27 resultados)

Paperback. Condición: Good. Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others?internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication?usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations. …

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Paperback. Condición: Good. Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others?internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication?usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations. …

Condición: Very Good. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Condición: Very Good. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

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PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: New. Series: American Politics & Political Economy S. Num Pages: 300 pages. BIC Classification: JPH; JPL; JPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 250 x 200 x 20. Weight in Grams: 424. . 1991. 1st. Paperback. . . . . …

PAP. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condición: New. pp. 299 Figures.

Condición: New. Series: American Politics & Political Economy S. Num Pages: 300 pages. BIC Classification: JPH; JPL; JPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 250 x 200 x 20. Weight in Grams: 424. . 1991. 1st. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

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Condición: New. pp. 299 Index.

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Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 299 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

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Condición: New. KlappentextrnrnWhy do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others--internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to th.

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Neuware - Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force They routinely delegate their power to others--internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication--usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In 'The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the 'autonomy' of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.…

Paperback. Condición: Brand New. 1st edition. 299 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.