ISBN: 9780199687602 - quitting certainties: a bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief (23 resultados)

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Condición: New. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief-the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics. Num Pages: 362 pages, black & white illustrations, black & white line drawings, black & white tables, figures. BIC Classification: HP; HPK; PBB. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 157 x 19. Weight in Grams: 538. . 2014. Paperback. . . . . …

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Condición: New. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief-the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics. Num Pages: 362 pages, black & white illustrations, black & white line drawings, black & white tables, figures. BIC Classification: HP; HPK; PBB. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 157 x 19. Weight in Grams: 538. . 2014. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day--cases in which agents forget information, or in which they assign degrees of belief to self-locating claims.Quitting Certainties argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability of Conditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at anearlier time to less-than-certainty later on. It then presents a new Bayesian updating framework that accurately represents rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.Titelbaum develops this new framework from the ground up, assuming little technical background on the part of his reader. He interprets Bayesian theories as formal models of rational requirements, leading him to discuss both the elements that go into a formal model and the general principles that linkformal systems to norms. By reinterpreting Bayesian methodology and altering the theory's updating rules, Titelbaum is able to respond to a host of challenges to Bayesianism both old and new. Theseresponses lead in turn to deeper questions about commitment, consistency, and the nature of information.Quitting Certainties presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesian framework unifying the treatment of memory loss and context-sensitivity. It develops this framework, motivates it, compares it to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief--the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. …

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day--cases in which agents forget information, or in which they assign degrees of belief to self-locating claims.Quitting Certainties argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability of Conditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at anearlier time to less-than-certainty later on. It then presents a new Bayesian updating framework that accurately represents rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.Titelbaum develops this new framework from the ground up, assuming little technical background on the part of his reader. He interprets Bayesian theories as formal models of rational requirements, leading him to discuss both the elements that go into a formal model and the general principles that linkformal systems to norms. By reinterpreting Bayesian methodology and altering the theory's updating rules, Titelbaum is able to respond to a host of challenges to Bayesianism both old and new. Theseresponses lead in turn to deeper questions about commitment, consistency, and the nature of information.Quitting Certainties presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesian framework unifying the treatment of memory loss and context-sensitivity. It develops this framework, motivates it, compares it to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief--the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. …

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day--cases in which agents forget information, or in which they assign degrees of belief to self-locating claims.Quitting Certainties argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability of Conditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at anearlier time to less-than-certainty later on. It then presents a new Bayesian updating framework that accurately represents rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.Titelbaum develops this new framework from the ground up, assuming little technical background on the part of his reader. He interprets Bayesian theories as formal models of rational requirements, leading him to discuss both the elements that go into a formal model and the general principles that linkformal systems to norms. By reinterpreting Bayesian methodology and altering the theory's updating rules, Titelbaum is able to respond to a host of challenges to Bayesianism both old and new. Theseresponses lead in turn to deeper questions about commitment, consistency, and the nature of information.Quitting Certainties presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesian framework unifying the treatment of memory loss and context-sensitivity. It develops this framework, motivates it, compares it to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief--the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and quantum mechanics. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. …

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief-the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss. He compares the framework to alternative solutions, and applies it .…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief, called the Certainty-Loss Framework. Subjective Bayesianism is epistemologists' standard theory of how individuals should change their degrees of belief over time. But despite the theory's power, it is widely recognized to fail for situations agents face every day--cases in which agents forget information, or in which they assign degrees of belief to self-locating claims. Quitting Certainties argues that these failures stem from a common source: the inability of Conditionalization (Bayesianism's traditional updating rule) to model claims' going from certainty at an earlier time to less-than-certainty later on. It then presents a new Bayesian updating framework that accurately represents rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.Titelbaum develops this new framework from the ground up, assuming little technical background on the part of his reader. He interprets Bayesian theories as formal models of rational requirements, leading him to discuss both the elements that go into a formal model and the general principles that link formal systems to norms. By reinterpreting Bayesian methodology and altering the theory's updating rules, Titelbaum is able to respond to a host of challenges to Bayesianism both old and new. These responses lead in turn to deeper questions about commitment, consistency, and the nature of information.Quitting Certainties presents the first systematic, comprehensive Bayesian framework unifying the treatment of memory loss and context-sensitivity. It develops this framework, motivates it, compares it to alternatives, then applies it to cases in epistemology, decision theory, the theory of identity, and the philosophy of quantum mechanics.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. Quitting Certainties | A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief | Michael G. Titelbaum | Taschenbuch | Englisch | 2014 | OUP UK | EAN 9780199687602 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …