Isbn: 9780199278855 - the samaritan's dilemma: the political economy of development aid (28 resultados)

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Condición: New. The authors argue that much of foreign aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida's institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offer concrete suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. Num Pages: 288 pages, 2 boxes, 1 table and numerous figures. BIC Classification: KCM; KCP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 233 x 156 x 20. Weight in Grams: 418. . 2005. Paperback. . . . .…

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Condición: New. The authors argue that much of foreign aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida's institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offer concrete suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. Num Pages: 288 pages, 2 boxes, 1 table and numerous figures. BIC Classification: KCM; KCP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 233 x 156 x 20. Weight in Grams: 418. . 2005. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

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Paperback. Condición: New. What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements. The authors of this book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a country with low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid. Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs.…

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Paperback. Condición: New. What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements. The authors of this book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a country with low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid. Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs.…

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements.The authors ofthis book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid deliverysystem and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a countrywith low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid.Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs. The authors argue that much of foreign aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida's institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offer concrete suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

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Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements.The authors ofthis book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid deliverysystem and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a countrywith low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid.Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs. The authors argue that much of foreign aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida's institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offer concrete suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

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Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 288 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condición: New. Print on Demand pp. 288.

Paperback. Condición: new. Paperback. What's wrong with foreign aid? Many policymakers, aid practitioners, and scholars have called into question its ability to increase economic growth, alleviate poverty, or promote social development. At the macro level, only tenuous links between development aid and improved living conditions have been found. At the micro level, only a few programs outlast donor support and even fewer appear to achieve lasting improvements.The authors ofthis book argue that much of aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid deliverysystem and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. In their analysis, the authors apply the theoretical insights of the new institutional economics to several settings. First, they investigate the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, to analyze how that aid agency's institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired outcomes, contrary to the desires of its own staff. Second, the authors use cases from India, a countrywith low aid dependence, and Zambia, a country with high aid dependence, to explore how institutions on the ground in recipient countries also mediate the effectiveness of aid.Throughout the book, the authors offer suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. These suggestions include how to structure evaluations in order to improve outcomes, how to employ agency staff to gain from their on-the-ground experience, and how to engage stakeholders as "owners" in the design, resource mobilization, learning, and evaluation processes of development assistance programs. The authors argue that much of foreign aid's failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida's institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offer concrete suggestions about how to improve aid's effectiveness. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Condición: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 288.

Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The authors argue that much of foreign aid s failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. They explore the workings of Sida and find that Sida s institutions lead to perverse incentives and poor outcomes in the field. The authors offe.…

Taschenbuch. Condición: Neu. The Samaritan's Dilemma | The Political Economy of Development Aid | Clark C. Gibson (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2005 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199278855 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. …