9780199269181 - strategic learning and its limits: arne ryde memorial lectures 2002 (ryde lectures) de young, h. peyton (21 resultados)
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Librería: Anybook.com, Lincoln, Reino UnidoAnybook.com
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Condición: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,450grams, ISBN:9780199269181.
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Librería: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Estados Unidos de AmericaGreatBookPrices
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EUR 67,73
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Hardback. Condición: New. Illustrated. In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regre…t learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence.In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners.
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Condición: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
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Librería: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Reino UnidoRia Christie Collections
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Librería: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, IrlandaKennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd.
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Condición: New. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its v…ariants; and hypothesis testing. Series: Ryde Lectures. Num Pages: 176 pages, numerous graphs and line drawings, mathematical examples. BIC Classification: JMA; JMRL; KCA; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 213 x 148 x 20. Weight in Grams: 370. . 2004. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . .
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EUR 69,06
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Condición: New. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its v…ariants; and hypothesis testing. Series: Ryde Lectures. Num Pages: 176 pages, numerous graphs and line drawings, mathematical examples. BIC Classification: JMA; JMRL; KCA; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 213 x 148 x 20. Weight in Grams: 370. . 2004. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
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Librería: BennettBooksLtd, Los Angeles, CA, Estados Unidos de AmericaBennettBooksLtd
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Hardcover. Condición: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title.
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EUR 62,92
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Hardback. Condición: New. Illustrated. In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regre…t learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence.In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners.
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Librería: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Estados Unidos de AmericaPBShop.store US
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HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
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HRD. Condición: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.
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Hardback. Condición: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.
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Condición: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret… learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's frameworkemphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He alsostresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence. In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; and hypothesis testing. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
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EUR 108,13
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret… learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.Young's frameworkemphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He alsostresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence.In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; and hypothesis testing. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
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EUR 68,65
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Hardcover. Condición: new. Hardcover. In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret… learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's frameworkemphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He alsostresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence. In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; and hypothesis testing. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
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Librería: moluna, Greven, Alemaniamoluna
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Gebunden. Condición: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem reinforcement and regret equilib…rium conditional no-regret learning prediction.
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Librería: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, AlemaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
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EUR 86,12
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Buch. Condición: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcemen…t and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence.In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners.
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Librería: preigu, Osnabrück, Alemaniapreigu
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EUR 95,60
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Buch. Condición: Neu. Strategic Learning and Its Limits | H. Peyton Young | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2014 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780199269181 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, Postfach:81 03 40, 70567 Stuttgart, vertrieb[at]dbg[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.
